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Preface 
The book Radically Elementary Probability Theory (Nelson, 1987, Preface) 
is an attempt to lay new foundations for probability theory using a 
tiny bit of nonstandard analysis. The mathematical background is 
little more than that which is taught in high school, and it is my hope 
that it will make deep results from the modern theory of stochastic 
processes readily available to anyone who can add, multiply, and 
reason. 
The "tiny bit of nonstandard analysis" is really "tiny" entailing little more 
than a rigorous notion of infinitesimals. Nelson (1987) introduces it in three 
brief chapters. We give a more belabored treatment (our Part I), but almost 
everything one needs to know about nonstandard analysis are the arithmetic 
rules for infinitesimal, appreciable, and unlimited numbers ( a number is unlim-
ited if its reciprocal is infinitesimal, and a number is appreciable if it is neither 
infinitesimal or unlimited) given in the tables in our Section 3.3, the principle 
of external induction - an axiom of the nonstandard analysis used in Nelson 
{1987) and this book (Axiom IV in Section 2.1) - and the principle of overspill 
(our Section 3.4). 
With this tiny bit of nonstandard analysis in hand Nelson (1987) radically 
simplifies probability theory, adopting two principles ( explained in our Sec-
tion 5.1). All probability spaces have 
(i) finite sample space and 
(ii) no nonempty events of probability zero. 
These have the consequence that expectations always exist and are given by 
finite sums, conditional expectations are unique and given by a simple formula, 
also involving a finite sum, our equation (5.5), and no measure theory is neces-
sary. 
One might think that this ''radical" simplification is too radical - throwing 
the baby out with the bathwater - but Nelson (1987) and this book provide 
some evidence that this is not so. Even though our theory has no continuous 
random variables or even discrete random variables with infinite sample space, 
hence no normal, exponential, Poisson, and so forth random variables. We shall 
see that finite approximations satisfactorily take their place. 
vii 
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Consider a Binomial( n, p) random variable X such that neither p nor 1 - p is 
infinitesimal and n is unlimited. Then (the Nelson-style analog of} the central 
limit theorem says that (X -np)/ Jp(l - p)/n has a distribution that is "nearly 
normal" in the sense that the distribution function of this random variable 
differs from the distribution function of the normal distribution in conventional 
probability only by an infinitesimal amount at any point (our Theorem 8.2). 
Consider a Binomial( n, p) random variable X such that p is infinitesimal 
but np is appreciable. Then X has a distribution that is "nearly Poisson" in 
the sense that the distribution function of this random variable differs from the 
distribution function of the Poisson(np) distribution in conventional probability 
only by an infinitesimal amount at any point ( unfortunately this result is in a 
yet to be written chapter of this book, but is easily proved}. 
Consider a Geometric(p) random variable X such that p is infinitesimal and 
choose a (necessarily infinitesimal} number e such that Y = eX has apprecia-
ble expectation µ. Then Y has a distribution that is "nearly exponential" in 
the sense that the distribution function of this random variable differs from 
the distribution function of the Exponential(l/ µ) distribution in conventional 
probability only by an infinitesimal amount at any point. 
Thus although Nelson-style probability theory does not have continuous ran-
dom variables, it does have discrete analogs that take their place. One is en-
titled to ask what is the point? Nelson makes one point in the text quoted 
above: the level of mathematical difficulty is much lower. In teaching proba-
bility at levels below Ph.D. we are used to starting with Kolmogorov's axioms 
and Venn diagrams and mutually exclusive events and - just when the students 
are thoroughly confused - dropping the whole subject. When expectation is 
introduced, it is entirely the nineteenth-century, pre-Kolmogorov notion. Many 
topics are discussed with allusions to Kolmogorov-style theory but without rigor 
because measure theoretic abstraction is deemed too difficult for the level of the 
course. Nelson-style theory avoids the necessity for all this handwaving. It pro-
vides a different kind of rigor that is understandable, perhaps ( as Nelson claims) 
even by high school students. 
We would not like to make the wrong impression. As Nelson (1987, p. 13) 
says, all mathematics involves abstractions. The notion of an unlimited number 
(which is larger than any number you could actually name) is just as much 
an abstraction as an infinite sequence. The question is which abstraction do 
we wish to use. If we choose to use actually infinite sequences, then measure 
theory is unavoidable. If we choose to use nonstandard analysis, then the law 
of large numbers (Nelson, 1987, Chapter 16) can be stated without reference 
to measure theory. The mathematical content is not exactly the same, but the 
same purposes are served. Both laws of large numbers (Kolmogorov and Nel-
son) serve equally well in applications, such as justifying statistical inference. 
Neither flavor of abstraction makes the proof of the theorem trivial. Char-
lie's law of conservation of mathematical difficulty says that, no matter what 
abstraction you use, at the end of the day you still have prove something is 
less than e and that calculation is always essentially the same. Neither Nelson 
(1987) nor this book is easy reading. I admit that most American undergradu-
ix 
ates (never mind high school students) are not comfortable with mathematical 
arguments that run over several pages with many steps. Regardless of the level 
of abstraction, such arguments are unavoidable. Nevertheless Nelson (1987) is a 
remarkable tour de force. In 79 small format pages he goes from nothing to what 
he calls the de Moivre-Laplace-Lindeberg-Feller-Wiener-Levy-Doob-Erdos-Kac-
Donsker-Prohorov theorem, which 
is a version of the de Moivre-Laplace central limit theorem that con-
tains Lindeberg's theorem on the sufficiency of his condition, Feller's 
theorem on its necessity, Wiener's theorem on the continuity of the 
trajectories for his process, the Levy-Doob characterization of it as 
the only normalized martingale with continuous trajectories, and the 
invariance principle of Erdos and Kac as extended by Donsker and 
Prohorov. 
Nelson ends by saying 
This is an arbitrary stopping point. More can be done. I hope 
that someone will write a truly elementary book on stochastic pro-
cesses along these lines, complete with exercises and applications. 
I cannot claim that this is that book. At least this book is "along these lines." 
We follow Nelson in using only ''radically elementary" nonstandard analysis 
based on four axioms from Nelson (1987) (our Section 2.1) and only "radi-
cally elementary" probability theory based on principles (i) and (ii) above. We 
have filled in many details left untouched by Nelson, in particular the rela-
tionship of the central limit theorem mentioned above, which is the climax of 
Nelson (1987), to x r-+ exp(-x2 /2)/.../ii. We also do weak convergence on arbi-
trary metric spaces, Prohorov metric, Levy metric, the portmanteau theorem, 
Slutsky's theorem, the continuous mapping theorem, and the Glivenko-Cantelli 
theorem. 
However, my interests are not in stochastic processes, except for spatial 
point processes and Markov chains, but in statistics. The original idea of this 
book was to rewrite statistics in "radically elementary" fashion, but I have only 
barely begun that task. The reason this incomplete draft is being turned into a 
technical report is so that the thesis of Bernardo Borba de Andrade, which deals 
with the "radically elementary" approach to Markov chains, can cite some of the 
results in the part of my planned book that now exists (this technical report), 
in particular, the relationship between characteristic functions and convergence 
in distribution ( Chapter 11) that he uses to prove the central limit theorem for 
alpha-mixing stationary processes. I hope that some of the planned additions 
to this book will eventually be written. 
Whether the "radically elementary" or "Nelson-style" approach is better or 
worse than the "conventional" or "Kolmogorov-style" approach is something we 
cannot yet say. I can only hope that a reader of Nelson (1987) and·this book 
will concede that our approach has promise. It is a huge task to rewrite all of 
probability theory in the new style. Many people will not think it worth the 
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effort even if the new style is simpler, more elegant, and easier to understand. 
Moreover, it must be conceded that the new style is not always more elegant. 
In particular, I had a great deal of difficulty proving the Levy continuity the-
orem (our Theorem 11.8) because characteristic functions are messier objects 
when only discrete random variables are allowed: compare the form (11.11) 
of the characteristic function of the discrete double exponential distribution to 
t ~ 1/(1 + t2 /cx2 ) of its continuous analog and the inelegant condition (11.16) 
that is required for the former to be well approximated by the latter. Other 
characteristic functions are worse. Generally one has no closed form expression, 
messy or otherwise. 
The new style also takes a lot of getting used to. It is hard to abandon the 
unique normal distribution of conventional theory. In our new theory we call 
"normal" any distribution whose distribution function differs from the distri-
bution function of the normal distribution in conventional probability only by 
an infinitesimal amount at any point. This huge class of distributions is very 
like the conventional normal distribution in some respects and very unlike it in 
others. In particular, the moments need be nothing like those of a conventional 
normal distribution. Even if we add the condition that our "Nelson-style" nor-
mal distributions be (Nelson-style) L2 so that first and second moments agree 
( to within an infinitesimal amount) with those of the conventional normal dis-
tribution (our Theorem 10.7), higher moments need not agree. 
Now is this a good thing or a bad thing? Originally, the normal distribution 
was not thought of as a real distribution but only as a limit arising in the de 
Moivre-Laplace theorem. Gradually, through the work of Gauss, Quetelet, and 
others the normal distribution was reified so we now think of it as a real distribu-
tion. But much of late twentieth century statistics, especially nonparametrics 
and robustness, had the objective of knocking the normal distribution off its 
pedestal. I& is part of the problem or part of the solution that E(X4 ) = 3u4 for 
the normal distribution? Confidence intervals for the population variance based 
on the F distribution give incorrect results, even asymptotically incorrect, un-
less the population fourth central moment is exactly three times the population 
second central moment squared. We have no reason to believe that will be true 
in real applications. A well-known introductory textbook (Moore and McCabe, 
1989, pp. 568-569) said 
The F test and other procedures for inference about variances 
are so lacking in robustness as to be of little use in practice. 
reproducing figures from Pearson and Please (1975) as evJdence. So is the 
uniqueness of the normal distribution in conventional theory a benefit or a trap 
for the unwary? Here it seems to a trap. The theory of "exact" confidence 
intervals based on the F distribution ( assuming ''exact" normality) is elegant 
but worthless in application precisely because "exact" normality is too much 
to ask. In Nelson-style theory the unique continuous normal distribution goes 
back to being only a limit that is never reached and doesn't really exist, so we 
are not tempted to take it too seriously. 
xi 
Many other cases could be considered where conventional theory "takes in-
finity too seriously." Marginalization paradoxes arising from the use of improper 
priors in Bayesian inference (Dawid, et al., 1973) are an example. Nelson-style 
improper priors do not exist because any positive measure on a finite sample 
space can be renormalized so that it is a probability measure. There are Nelson-
style analogs to improper priors. For example, the uniform distribution on a 
grid of points that has infinitesimal spacing and extends to unlimited num-
bers in both positive and negative directions behaves in some respects just like 
Lebesgue measure as an improper prior. But since the Nelson-style "improper" 
prior is in fact proper (a probability distribution), no paradoxes can arise. Here 
the supposed simplicity of conventional theory is not simple at all. It leads 
only to confusion and incoherence. The extreme technical difficulty of deciding 
when an improper prior leads to sensible inference (Eaton, 1992) is notorious. 
In Nelson-style theory, the issue simply does not arise. 
The same point has been made about using finitely additive probability the-
ory by Sudderth (1980). Nelson-style "radically elementary" probability theory 
is in this respect and some other respects - especially in Nelson's definition 
of "almost surely" (see our Section 6.1) - much like finitely additive proba-
bility theory because, of course, if the sample space is finite, then countable 
additivity is vacuous. In other respects, Nelson-style theory is not much like 
finitely additive theory. As we have stressed, in Nelson-style theory the level 
of abstraction is much lower than conventional Kolmogorov-style theory. The 
level of abstraction of finitely additive theory tends to be much higher than 
conventional theory. 
For a long time I have wondered why probability theory is the way it is. Why 
is based on Kolmogorov {1933)? As mentioned above, finitely additive theory 
has been studied, although nowhere near as intensively as the Kolmogorov-style 
countably additive theory. Kolmogorov himself ( along with others) initiated 
other approaches, such as the so-called algorithmic complexity approach {Li and 
Vitanyi, 1997). There is a remarkable paper by Solovay {1970) which shows that 
is it possible to make set-theoretic assumptions (incompatible with the axiom 
of choice) so that every subset of the real numbers is Lebesgue measurable. So-
calledLoeb measure (Loeb, 1975) uses Robinson-style nonstandard analysis (see 
our Chapter 1 for brief explanation of that) to construct probability measures. 
The emphasis of probability over expectation in conventional theory can be 
reversed, as in Whittle (2005). Finally, as everyone is well aware, probability 
theory had nearly 300 years of history before 1933 in which many important 
theorems were proved without measure theory. So why do we do probability 
theory the way we do? 
This is not just a question of the history and sociology of mathematics. In 
statistics, especially, theorems often only have heuristic value. The central limit 
theorem does not assure that normal approximation is good in any particular 
application, only that it will be good for some sufficiently large sample size, 
perhaps billions and billions of times larger than in any application. If it were 
really the case that sample sizes of billions and billions were required, then no 
one would care about the theorem, despite its beauty. Statisticians who worry 
xii PREFACE 
about the validity of normal approximation sometimes do simulations to check, 
and they find that it sometimes works well and sometimes not, depending on 
the details of the application. So the theorem does, at least sometimes, provide 
a useful guide to practice, even if it provides no guarantee. When we change the 
abstractions we use, we often change the atmospherics, hence we often change 
the heuristics, even though the mathematical assertions of the theorems are 
very similar. Nelson's central limit theorem is very similar to the conventional 
central limit theorem in what it says, but because the limiting distribution is 
not unique (it is unique up to near equivalence, of course), it feels different. 
The normal distribution, as we said above, doesn't really exist in Nelson-style 
theory. Hence we take some of its properties, such as its fourth moment, much 
less seriously. 
I started working on "radically elementary" probability and statistics merely 
out of curiosity. I had to struggle to unlearn some ingrained habits from con-
ventional theory. But I have been richly rewarded. Conventional theory looks 
different to me now. I have a broader perspective, a wider context. To me, that 
is even more important than simplicity and elegance. 
Part I 
Nonstandard Analysis 
1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This part of the book introduces so-called "nonstandard analysis,,, which is 
the branch of mathematics that makes rigorous use of infinitesimals. The early 
history of infinitesimals starts with the invention of calculus by Newton and 
Leibniz in the late seventeenth century. From then until the late nineteenth 
century all calculus and analysis ( the mathematician's term for advanced cal-
culus, as in the title of Cauchy's Cours d'Analyse de l'Ecole Royale Polytech-
nique) used infinitesimals, although questions about rigor persisted throughout 
this period. In the late nineteenth century, the delta-epsilon definitions of limits, 
continuity, derivatives, and integrals still in use today provided the first rigorous 
foundations for calculus. From then until the middle of the twentieth century 
infinitesimals were banished for lack of rigor. 
The reasons for banishment of infinitesimals disappeared with the publica-
tion of Robinson (1996, first edition 1966). Interestingly, Robinson's work grew 
out of the process of formalization of mathematics that made infinitesimals seem 
nonrigorous in the first place. What goes around comes around. 
Model theory is the branch of mathematical logic that deals with models 
for axiomatic systems. Given a set of axioms, a model for those axioms is a 
mathematical object that satisfies the axioms. If the axioms in question are 
those for a vector space, then a model is just a vector space. This may seem 
trivial, but it is profound. For one thing, the existence of a model means the 
axioms are consistent, meaning they imply no contradiction (statements that 
follow from the axioms and contradict each other), because no model can satisfy 
a contradiction. For another thing, it leads to the question of what sort of 
models can satisfy the axioms. Again, if the axioms in question are those for a 
vector space, then the question is what vector spaces exist and what are their 
properties? So this question encompasses the whole subject of linear algebra. 
If the axioms in question are those for the real numbers, then the question is 
what real number systems can exist? We are taught in conventional mathemat-
ics about the real number system. But model theoretic study of the axioms for 
the real numbers shows that uniqueness of the real numbers cannot be proved, 
and that "nonstandard,, models exist. Robinson exploited this fact to bring 
3 
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infinitesimals back into rigorous mathematics. He constructed, in conventional 
mathematics, nonstandard models of the real numbers having elements that 
could be interpreted as infinitesimals. For a recent, fairly elementary, treatment 
of such model-theoretic constructions, see Goldblatt (1998). 
Nelson (1977) introduced axiomatic nonstandard analysis in which the be-
havior of nonstandard concepts is derived from axioms rather than by explicit 
construction of models. In some ways this is simpler than the approach of 
Robinson (1996), since it requires no knowledge of model theory. Many other 
axiomatic theories of nonstandard analysis have since been developed. Gordon, 
Kusraev and Kutateladze (2002) and Kanovei and Reeken (2004) give encyclo-
pedic coverage of them. These various versions of nonstandard analysis can 
be considered different formalizations of the same subject. Although axiomatic 
nonstandard analysis following Nelson (1977) requires no model theory, it does 
require a lot of set theory. In this book we are going to use a very simple version 
of nonstandard analysis found in Nelson (1987), which requires very little set 
theory. 
In this version of nonstandard analysis, we consider the real number system 
we use to be the same as the real number system of conventional mathematics 
in the sense that every conventional mathematical theorem about it remains 
the same. Those theorems are silent about infinitesimals. They neither prove 
infinitesimals exist nor prove they do not exist~ Hence we may assume that 
infinitesimals do exist and are real numbers just like any other real numbers. 
We might worry that this will cause trouble, but we shall be very careful. Our 
mathematics with infinitesimals will be based on axioms (taken from Nelson, 
1987), which are theorems of the version of nonstandard analysis in Nelson 
(1977); see p. 80 in Nelson (1987). A theorem in Nelson (1977), attributed 
to Powell, asserts that the theory of that paper and conventional mathematics 
(as formalized in Zermelo-Frankel set theory with the axiom of choice, usually 
abbreviated ZFC) are equiconsistent (meaning both theories are consistent or 
both are inconsistent). Since the celebrated inconsistency theorem of Godel says 
that the consistency of ZFC cannot be proved within ZFC, this is all that can 
be said. Our nonstandard analysis is consistent if conventional mathematics is 
itself consistent. 
Chapter 2 
The Natural Numbers 
The objects of this version of nonstandard analysis are the objects of con-
ventional mathematics: the integers, the real numbers, and so forth. No new 
objects are added. Nothing in conventional mathematics is changed. Every 
theorem of conventional mathematics remains true. 
In particular, the natural numbers, the set N = {O, 1, 2, ... }, remains the 
same as it is in conventional mathematics. 
2.1 Axioms 
Our only addition to conventional mathematics is an undefined property 
standard and four axioms that govern the use of this property. 
(I) 0 is standard. 
(II) If n E N is standard, then so is n + 1. 
(III) There exists an n E N that is not standard. 
(IV) If A is any property such that A(O) holds and A( n) --+ A( n + 1) holds for 
all standard n EN, then A(n) holds for all standard n EN. 
We define nonstandard to mean not standard. Hence we usually say axiom 
(III) asserts the existence of a nonstandard n EN. We also define limited as a 
synonym of standard and unlimited as a synonym of nonstandard. (In the next 
chapter these terms will become nonsynonymous when limited and unlimited 
can be applied to real numbers and standard and nonstandard cannot.) We 
could replace "standard" everywhere it appears in the axioms by "limited," but 
we do not do so, partly to follow Nelson (1987) and partly to distinguish between 
the undefined term "standard" that has no meaning other than that given by 
its appearance in these axioms and the term "limited" which is defined in terms 
of "standard." 
The complicated axiom {IV) is called external induction. We also, of course, 
inherit conventional mathematical induction from conventional mathematics. 
5 
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To explain the difference, we need the following terminology. A property from 
conventional mathematics ( defined without any reference, direct or indirect, 
to the property "standard"} is called internal. A property that is not inter-
nal is external. Our only examples of external properties so far are standard, 
nonstandard, limited, and unlimited, but later on we shall meet infinitesimal, 
nearly continuous, and many more. Following Nelson, we extend this termi-
nology to mathematics itself and sometimes say internal mathematics instead 
of "conventional mathematics" and internal induction instead of "conventional 
mathematical induction." Internal induction is the following, which is a theorem 
of set theory. 
(V) If A is any internal property such that A(0) holds and A(n)-. A(n + 1) 
holds for all n EN, then A(n) holds for all n EN. 
Note that internal induction can only be applied to internal properties ( conven-
tional mathematical induction can only be applied to conventional mathematical 
properties). If (V) could be applied with A(n) meaning "n is standard," then 
together with axioms (I) and (II) it would imply that every natural number is 
standard, but that would contradict axiom (III), and our axioms would be in-
consistent when combined with those of conventional mathematics (ZFC). Note 
that external induction (IV) applied with A(n) meaning "n is standard" only 
produces the tautology that every standard n is standard. 
So these axioms produce no immediately obvious contradiction. As was 
mentioned at the end of the last chapter, our theory is consistent if conven-
tional mathematics is consistent. Thus we need not worry about contradictions, 
obvious or not. 
Theorem 2.1. The numbers 1, 2, ... , 10 are limited. 
The proof is obvious. Axioms (I) and (II) together imply that 1 is limited. 
Having established that, another application of axiom (II) shows that 2 is lim-
ited. Then another shows that 3 is limited. And so forth. Clearly the process 
need not stop at 10. The theorem would be just as true if we replaced 10 by a 
thousand or a million. (There would just be more steps to the proof.) We can-
not, however, strengthen Theorem 2.1 by removing the upper bound entirely. 
That would conflict with axiom (III). 
2.2 Arithmetic 
If we want to increase the upper bound in Theorem 2.1 we can make our 
proof more efficient by using external induction. 
Theorem 2.2. If m and n are limited natural numbers, then so is m + n. 
Proof. Fix a limited m E N and let A(n) be the property "m + n is limited." 
By axiom (II) and external induction A( n) holds for all limited n. D 
Now we can count limited numbers a little faster: 10 + 10 = 20 is limited, 
20 + 20 = 40 is limited, and so forth. 
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Theorem 2.3. If m and n are limited natural numbers, then so ism· n. 
Proof. Fix a limited m E N and let A( n) be the property "m · n is limited." By 
Theorem 2.2 and external induction A(n) holds for all standard n. D 
Now we can count limited numbers a faster still: 10 · 10 = 100 is limited, 
100 -100 = 10,000 is limited, and so forth. 
Theorem 2.4. If m and n are limited natural numbers, then so is mn. 
Proof. Fix a limited m EN and let A(n) be the property "mn is limited." By 
Theorem 2.3 and external induction A(n) holds for all standard n. D 
Now we can count limited numbers much faster: 1010 is limited, 101010 
is limited, and so forth. We could accelerate this process further with further 
applications of external induction, but we have run out of familiar mathematical 
operations (what comes after addition, multiplication, exponentiation?) and so 
will be content to stop here. 
2.3 Order 
We now fill in the gaps in our counting. 
Theorem 2.5. If n and v are natural numbers, n limited and II unlimited, then 
n< II. 
Proof. Fix an unlimited v, and let A(n) be the property n < v. Since v is 
unlimited, it is not zero, hence A(0) holds. If n is limited and A(n) holds, then 
n + 1 is limited and n + 1 :::; 11, and since equality is impossible when n + 1 is 
limited and v is unlimited, we actually have A( n + 1 ). Thus external induction 
implies n < 11 for all limited n. D 
Hence we could now improve Theorem 2.1 to say that 1, 2, ... , 101010 are 
limited, but we won't bother with a theorem number and a formal statement. 
2.4 Illegal Set Formation 
It is a principle of internal mathematics that properties can be used to define 
sets (the subset axiom or the axiom of specification of ZFC). 
(VI) For any internal property A and any set S, there exists a set B such that 
x EB if and only. if x ES and A(x). 
The set B is unique (by the axiom of extension of ZFC) and is usually denoted 
{x ES: A(x)} (2.1) 
But nothing in internal mathematics says that external properties can be used 
to define sets in this way (internal mathematics having no external properties). 
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Moreover, none of our four axioms of nonstandard analysis allows the use of 
(2.1) when A is an external property. Nelson calls attempts to use (2.1) with A 
external illegal set formation. 
This explains why we only distinguish between internal and external proper-
ties and not between internal and external objects. From a foundational point 
of view, everything is a set. Natural numbers are sets: zero is just another 
name for the empty set, one is the set {O}, two is the set {O, 1}, and so forth. 
Signs are identified with {O, 1} and integers with ordered pairs of a sign and a 
natural number. Rational numbers are identified with ordered pairs of integers. 
Real numbers are identified with Dedekind cuts of rationals (pairs of sets of 
rationals). Functions are identified with their graphs, which are subsets of the 
Cartesian product of the domain and range. And so forth. The rule against 
illegal set formation disallows the use of (2.1) when A is external. Thus there is 
no way to get any new sets that are not already present in internal mathematics, 
hence no new mathematical objects of any sort. All objects are internal. Only 
properties can be internal or external. 
This is a bit confusing; one must make an effort to keep this distinction 
clear. When we say a natural number v is unlimited, we are asserting A(v) 
holds where A is the external property defined by A(n) means "n is unlimited," 
but v itself is an internal object. From a foundational point of view, v is the 
set { 0, ... , v - 1} and the principles of set theory allow us to form this set for 
any natural number v. 
The rule about illegal set formation is very important because ignoring it is 
like money laundering: it destroys the distinction between internal and external 
properties and internal and external induction. If A is a property and B is a 
set such that A(x) holds if and only if x EB, then the property A' defined by 
A'(x) meaning x EB is equivalent to A and is an internal property, because B 
is an internal set ( all sets being internal) and E is an internal relation. 
Theorem 2.6. There does not exist a subset B of N such that n E B if and 
only if n is limited. 
Proof. Suppose the set B described by the theorem does exist. Then the prop-
erty A defined by A(n) means "n EB" is an internal property, and we can apply 
internal induction to it. Axiom (I) implies A(O), and Axiom (II) implies A(n) 
implies A(n) --+ A(n + 1). We conclude A(n) holds for all n E N, which says 
that every natural number is limited, but that contradicts Axiom (III). Hence 
no such set exists. D 
The rule about illegal set formation does not deny existence; it merely denies 
a particular justification of existence. Let A( n) be the property "n is limited 
and n < 6." At first sight A appears to be an external property because it 
involves the external property "limited." However, we know from Theorem 2.1 
that the elements of the set B = {0, 1,2,3,4,5} are all limited and thus we see 
that A is equivalent to the internal property A' defined by A' ( n) meaning either 
n EB or n < 6. 
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Thus even though the rule about illegal set formation forbids us to use the 
subset axiom as a justification of the existence of this set, it nevertheless exists. 
If we want to show that no set corresponds to an external property, then we 
need a theorem (like Theorem 2.6). Without a theorem proving either existence 
or non-existence, we do not know whether any set corresponds to an external 
property. All we know is that there is no rule that asserts it automatically exists 
and that we can't just blithely use the notation (2.1} as if there were such a 
rule. 
Chapter 3 
Real Numbers 
Any real number X lies between two integers lxJ and r xl, which are called 
the floor and ceiling of x and which are the greatest integer less than or equal 
to x and the least integer greater than or equal to x, respectively. If x is an 
integer, then lxJ = f xl- Otherwise, lxJ + 1 = f xl. 
Note that any two consecutive natural numbers n and n + 1 are either both 
limited or both unlimited. If n is limited, then so is n + 1 by Axiom II. If n is 
unlimited, then so is n + 1, by Theorem 2.5. 
Thus we extend the notions of limited and unlimited to real numbers as 
follows. 
• A nonnegative real number x is limited if and only if L xJ and f x 1 are 
standard. 
• A negative real number xis limited if and only if lxl is limited. 
Unlimited means not limited. 
We use the concept "limited" to define a new concept "infinitesimal." 
• 0 is infinitesimal 
• A nonzero real number x is infinitesimal if and only if 1 / x is unlimited. 
Another useful auxiliary concept is "appreciable." 
• A real number is appreciable if it is limited and not infinitesimal. 
It is important to remember that limited, unlimited, infinitesima~ non-
infinitesima~ and appreciable are external properties. 
Theorem 3.1. A nonzero real number x is infinitesimal if and only if 1/x is 
unlimited and is appreciable if and only if 1 / x is appreciable. 
Proof. The first assertion just restates the definition of infinitesimal. The sec-
ond assertion then follows because when x is appreciable 1/x can be neither 
infinitesimal nor unlimited. D 
11 
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With these definitions come new notation. In the following x and y are any 
real numbers. 
• x ~ y means x - y is infinitesimal. 
• x « y means x ~ y and x ~ y. 
• x ;S y means x ~ y or x ~ y. 
• x ~ oo means x is positive and unlimited. 
• x « oo means x ~ oo. 
• x » y means y « x. 
• x ~ y means y ;S x. 
• x ~ -oo means -x ~ oo. 
• x » -oo means -x « oo. 
And it is important to remember that all of the symbolic notations above express 
external properties. 
These notations are read as follows. 
• x ~ y is read x and y are nearly equal. 
• x « y is read x is appreciably less than y or x is strongly less than y. 
• x ;S y is read x is weakly less than y. 
Please note, to avoid any misunderstanding, that the notation x ~ oo does 
not ( despite appearances) assert that there are two objects x and oo that are 
nearly equal. It is just shorthand for x is positive and unlimited and says nothing 
about an object oo, not even that such an object exists. 
3.1 Order 
Theorem 3.2. lf f:,, x, €, y, and T/ are real numbers, f:, is negative and unlimited, 
x is negative and appreciable, € is infinitesimal, y is positive and appreciable, 
and T/ is positive and unlimited, then f:, < X < € < y < T/. 
Proof y < T/ is immediate from Theorem 2.5 and the definition of limited real 
numbers. Then € < y follows from the fact that for positive x and y we have 
x < y if and only if 1/y < 1/x (and from nonpositive numbers being less than 
positive numbers). The other inequalities follow from O < x < y if and only if 
-y < -x < 0. D 
3.2. ARITHMETIC 
3.2 Arithmetic 
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Theorem 3.3. If x and y are real numbers, then x + y is limited if both x and 
y are limited, and lxl + IYI is limited only if both x and y are limited. 
Proof. The forward part follows from Theorem 2.2 by the order properties of 
addition and the definitions of limited and unlimited real numbers. The converse 
part follows from max(lxl, IYI) ~ lxl + IYI· D 
Theorem 3.4. If x and y are real numbers, then x · y is limited if both x and 
y are limited. 
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2.3 by the order properties of multiplication 
and the definitions of limited and unlimited real numbers. D 
Corollary 3. 5. If x1 , ••• , Xn are limited real numbers and n is a limited natural 
number, then x1 + · · · + Xn is limited and x1 x · · · x Xn is limited. 
Proof. Apply external induction to Theorem 3.3 or Theorem 3.4. D 
Theorem 3.6. If x and y are real numbers, then x · y is unlimited if x is 
non-infinitesimal and y is unlimited. 
Proof. Suppose to get a contradiction that z = x · y is limited. Then, by 
Theorem 3.4, y = z · (1/x) is limited. D 
Theorem 3. 7. If x and y are real numbers, then x + y is infinitesimal if both 
x and y are infinitesimal, and lxl + IYI is infinitesimal only if both x and y are 
infinitesimal. 
Proof. The direct part is trivial when either x or y is zero, and because of 
Ix+ YI ~ lxl + IYI we may assume without loss of generality that x and y are 
positive, in which case we have . 
1 1 1 
-->-·----~oo 
x +y - 2 max(x,y) 
by the definition of infinitesimal and Theorem 3.6. 
The converse part follows from max(lxl, lyl) ~ lxl+IYI and Theorem 3.2. D 
Corollary 3.8. If x1, ... , Xn are infinitesimal real numbers and n is a limited 
natural number, then x 1 + · · · + Xn is infinitesimal. 
Proof Apply external induction to Theorem 3.7. 
Corollary 3.9. The external relation~ is an equivalence. 
D 
An equivalence relation is symmetric, reflexive, and transitive. The corollary 
asserts that ~ has these properties. We emphasize that it is an external relation. 
Hence { {x, y) ER x JR: x ~ y} and { x ER: x ~ y} are illegal set formation. 
We can prove facts about ~ but we cannot consider it a mathematical object 
(that is, a set), nor can we define objects, such as equivalence classes, in terms 
of it. 
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Proof. Symmetry, x ~ x for all x, is obvious. Reflexivity, x ~ y ~ y ~ x, is 
also obvious. Transitivity, x ~ y and y ~ z ~ x ~ z, follows from the sum of 
infinitesimals is infinitesimal (Theorem 3. 7). D 
Theorem 3.10. If x and y are real numbers, then x · y is infinitesimal if x is 
infinitesimal and y is limited. 
Proof. This is trivial when either x or y is zero, and because of jxyj = lxl · IYI 
we may assume without loss of generality that O < x $ y, in which case we have 
1 1 1 
--=-·-~00 
X·y X y 
by Theorem 3.6 because 1/x is unlimited and 1/y is non-infinitesimal. 0 
Theorem 3.11. exp(x) « oo if and only if x « oo. 
Proof. Since exp(x) $ 1 when x $ 0 and exp(x) $ 3f xl when x ~ 0, the "if' 
direction follows from Theorems 2.4 and 3.2. 
The "only if" direction follows from exp(x) ~ 1 + x (which is obvious from 
the Maclaurin series for exp). D 
Theorem 3.12. exp(x) ~ 1 if and only if x ~ 0. 
Proof. Suppose x ~ O. By the law of the mean there exists an x* between O 
and x such that 
exp(x) - exp(O) = exp(x*) · x. 
By Theorems 3.2, 3.10 and 3.11 the right hand side is infinitesimal. That proves 
one direction. 
Suppose x ~ 1. By the law of the mean there exists an x* between 1 and x 
such that 
1 
log(x) - log(l) = - · (x - 1) 
x* 
By theorems 3.1, 3.2, 3.10 and 3.11 the right hand side is infinitesimal. That 
proves the other direction. D 
3.3 Summary of Arithmetic 
Robert (1988) summarizes the arithmetic of nonstandard analysis in sev-
eral tables. This seems like a good idea, and we have copied it, making some 
modifications. 
Let 8 and € be infinitesimal real numbers, u and v appreciable real numbers, 
and X and Y unlimited real numbers. Then we have the following results about 
addition (and subtraction). 
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infinitesimal appreciable unlimited 
o, f u,v X,Y 
o+f o+u, lul+lvl o+X,u+X 
u+v IXl+IYI 
X+Y 
The wide boxes indicate lack of more specific information. We only know that 
u +vis limited. It may be infinitesimal (for example, if v = -u). And we can't 
say anything about X + Y. It may be infinitesimal, appreciable, or unlimited. 
And we have the following results about multiplication and division. 
infinitesimal appreciable unlimited 
o, € u,v X,Y 
0 · E, 0 • U U·V u·X,X-Y 
o/u, o/X, u/X u/v u/o, X/u, X/o 
o-X 
o/€, X/Y 
(Again the wide box contains results we can't say anything about in general.) 
When we consider exponentiation, the identities 
X-y = (.!)y = _!:__ 
X xY 
allow us to calculate xY for all positive real x and all real y if we are only given 
xY for x 2: 1 and y 2: 0. Thus we make a table only covering that case. If o, f, 
u, v, X, and Y are all nonnegative, we have the following results about powers. 
infinitesimal appreciable unlimited 
o, f u,v X,Y 
result:::: 1 1 « result « oo result :::: oo 
(1 + O)E, (1 + 0)1', (1 + U}° (1 + u)v (1 + u)x, X'', xY 
(1 + o)x, X 6 
Exercise 3-1. Verify all entries in the summary tables about addition, sub-
traction, multiplication, and division. For "wide boxes" not only show that the 
result is in the wide box but also give examples showing that the result can be 
in each part of the wide box. 
Exercise 3-2. Prove the assertions of each row of the following table: x has 
the external property in the left column if and only if exp(x) has the external 
property in the right column and same row. 
X 
x 2: 0 and x ~ 0 
o«x«oo 
X ==: 00 
y = exp(x) 
y 2: 1 and y ~ I 
l«y«oo 
y~oo 
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Also state and prove the analogous theorem about x and log(x). 
Exercise 3-3. Use the results of Exercises 3-1 and 3-2 to verify the summary 
table about exponentiation. As in Exercise 3-1, provide examples showing that 
results in the wide box can be either infinitesimal, appreciable, or unlimited. 
3.4 Overspill 
Illegal set formation is not just a complication that makes nonstandard anal-
ysis hard to understand. It is involved in an important proof technique called 
overspill. 
We have divided the real numbers into "parts" with external properties, but 
these parts are not sets. 
Theorem 3.13. There does not exist a set that contains all and only the __ 
real numbers, where the blank is filled in with any of the following: limited, 
unlimited, infinitesimal, non-infinitesimal, appreciable, or any of these modified 
by positive or negative. 
Proof. If the limited reals constituted a set L, then L n N would be the set B 
that Theorem 2.6 asserts does not exist. If the unlimited reals constituted a set 
U, then its complement would be L, which doesn't exist. If the infinitesimals 
constituted a set J, then { x E JR\ {O} : 1/x E J} would be U, which doesn't 
exist. If the non-infinitesimal reals constituted a set, then its complement would 
be I, which doesn't exist. If the appreciable reals constituted a set A, then 
(-1, 1] \ A would be I, which doesn't exist. 
If any of these modified by positive or negative constituted a set S, then 
S' = { -x : x E S} would be the same modified by negative or positive, 
respectively, and SUS' or (for infinitesimals) SUS' U {O} would be a set that 
we have already proved does not exist. D 
Now we explain overspill Suppose A is an internal property such that 
A(x) holds for all x in any one of the "non-sets" mentioned in the theorem, for 
concreteness, say the infinitesimals, that is, we are assuming A(x) holds for all 
infinitesimal x. Then because A is internal, 
B = { x E IR: A(x)} (3.1) 
is not illegal set formation. Now we know by assumption that A(x) holds for 
all infinitesimal x. If it held only for infinitesimal x, then B would be the set 
J which the proof shows does not exist. We conclude that A(x) holds for some 
non-infinitesimal x. In picturesque language, A spills over from infinitesimals 
to non-infinitesimals. In short, if A(x) holds for all infinitesimal x, then by 
overspill, it holds for some non-infinitesimal x (the words "by overspill" alluding 
to Theorem 3.13). 
There are three important things to note about this technique. The key 
issue is that A must be internal This method of proof is completely bogus 
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when applied to an external property, because then its starting point (3.1) is 
illegal set formation. 
The second issue is that the scope of the technique is not limited to the 
infinitesimals. As we hinted above, any of the "non-sets" mentioned in the 
theorem will work just as well, for example, if A(x) holds for all unlimited x, 
then, by overspill, it holds for some limited x. 
The third issue is that the technique works when the free variable ranges 
over the natural numbers, in which case "by overspill" alludes to Theorem 2.6 
instead of Theorem 3.13. For example, if A(n) is an internal property that holds 
for all unlimited n, then it holds for some limited n. 
As simple examples of overspill, we have the following. 
x '.:::'. 0 ~ (Ve» O)(lxl ~ f) 
x '.:::'. oo ~(Vy« oo)(y ~ x) 
To see the first one, let A(f) be the property !xi ~ f. If x is infinitesimal, then 
A(e) holds for every f » 0 by Theorem 3.2. Conversely, if A(€) holds for every 
e » 0, then, by overspill, it also holds for some infinitesimal e, which implies x 
is infinitesimal (by Theorem 3.2 every number smaller than an infinitesimal is 
infinitesimal). 
Chapter 4 
Calculus 
This chapter isn't really about calculus, despite its title. What it is about, is 
concepts from nonstandard analysis that compete with concepts from calculus 
and real analysis. 1 
4.1 Convergence 
A sequence x1, x 2 , ••• of nonrandom real numbers nearly converges to a real 
number x if 
Xn ~x, n~oo {4.la) 
(Nelson, 1987, Chapter 6). 
At first sight, this appears very different from the conventional notion of 
convergence. But the following definition, which looks more like the conventional 
notion, is equivalent. A sequence ... nearly converges ... if 
{''./€ » 0){3N « oo)('v'n ~ N)(lxn - xi ~ €). {4.lb) 
The reason these two definitions are equivalent is because they are both 
equivalent to a sequence ... nearly converges ... if 
€ » 0, N ~ oo. (4.lc) 
That (4.la) implies (4.lc) is clear. For the opposite direction, fix an n ~ oo. 
Then {4.lc) implies lxn - xi ~ € holds for all f » 0 and hence for some€~ 0 
by overspill. Hence {4.la) holds for this n and (since n ~ oo was arbitrary) for 
all unlimited n. 
1 It is possible to redo calculus and real and functional analysis using nonstandard analysis, 
but "radically elementary nonstandard analysis" is not the right vehicle. In order to define 
derivatives and integrals as mathematical objects, one needs what we have called the "full 
theory" Nelson's 1ST. Nelson {1977) ahd Gordon, et al. {2002, Chapter 2) give brief sketches 
of that theory. Robert {1988) gives a more complete discussion covering all of elementary 
calculus. 
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That (4.lb) implies (4.lc) is also clear. For the opposite direction, fix an 
e » 0. Then (4.lc) implies (\:/n ~ N)(lxn - xi ~ e) holds for all N ~ oo and 
hence for some N « oo by overspill. Hence ( 4.1 b) holds. 
Two more issues of note should be mentioned. First, the limit is not unique. 
Indeed (4.la) and x '.:= y implies by Corollary 3.9 that Xn nearly converges toy. 
Second, and this is what is important for Nelson-style probability theory, the 
concept applies quite nicely to finite sequences. 
Nelson (1987), after pointing out that near convergence is not exactly the 
same as ordinary convergence, drops the "near" because ordinary convergence 
is of no interest in Nelson-style probability theory. We will follow his lead. 
When we say "convergent," we always mean "nearly convergent" unless it is 
clear from the context that we are talking about the notion from conventional 
mathematics, although sometimes we say "nearly convergent" for emphasis. 
An important aspect of this notion of convergence is that in many contexts it 
makes sequences irrelevant. A sequence Xn is (nearly) convergent if Xm '.:= Xn for 
all unlimited m and n. So it is enough to understand ( the external equivalence 
relation) near equality. We never need to deal with the whole sequence; we 
always deal with two elements at a time (is Xm '.:= Xn or not?) 
In some respects, near convergence is very different from conventional con-
vergence. Consider a double sequence Xij and suppose 
Xij -> Y;, i-> 00 
j-> 00 
If we are talking about the conventional notion of convergence, this does not 
imply anything about joint convergence, the behavior of Xinjn as n -> oo for 
arbitrary subsequences in and in· But if we are talking about near convergence, 
then the situation is very different; 
implies 
because 
Xij ~ Y.1, 
Xij ~ Zi, 
i '.:= 00 
j '.:= 00 
i,j,m,n ~ oo 
whenever all of the indices are unlimited: that's just how equivalence relations 
(Corollary 3.9) behave. 
Thus we see that near convergence and conventional convergence are in some 
respects similar, but in other respects near convergence is a much stronger and 
more useful property. 
4.2. CONTINUITY 
4.2 Continuity 
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If Sis a subset of R, then a function g: S-+ JR is nearly continuous at the 
point x ES if 
(\/y E S)(x ~ y ~ g(x) ~ g(y)) (4.2) 
and nearly continuous on a set T C S if ( 4.2) holds for all x E T. 
As with near convergence, these concepts are analogous to some conventional 
concepts. Near continuity at a point xis analogous to conventional continuity at 
x, and near continuity on a set Tis analogous to conventional uniform continuity 
onT. 
For example, the function g : x .-. 1 / x is continuous (but not uniformly 
continuous) on (0, oo ), and for infinitesimal positive € we have g(e) - g(2e) = 
1/2e, which is unlimited, so g is not nearly continuous on (0, oo). 
Conversely, if g is nearly continuous on T, then for any e » 0 
(\/x E T)(\/y E T)(lx - YI ~ fJ ~ lg(x) - g(y)I ~ e) {4.3) 
holds for all infinitesimal o, hence, by overspill, for some non-infinitesimal o. 
Thus for every € » 0 there exists a fJ » 0 such that (4.3) holds, which looks 
like the conventional notion of uniform continuity (but isn't exactly because it 
has » where the conventional notion has > ). 
We need to know that familiar functions from calculus are nearly continuous. 
The following lemma says they are. 
Lemma 4.1. Suppose g is a differentiable function T-+ JR, where Tis an open 
interval, and g' is limited on T. Then g is nearly continuous on T. 
Proof. For x and y in T, by the mean value theorem, 
g(y) - g(x) = g'(e)(y - x) 
for some { between x and y. By assumption g'({) is limited, so if y- x ~ 0 we 
have g(y) - g(x) ~ 0 by Theorem 3.10. D 
This lemma is not sharp, because functions that are nearly continuous but 
not differentiable are easily defined. Moreover, even if g is differentiable, we 
do not need g' to be everywhere limited in order for g to be continuous. The 
lemma does, however, handle familiar "nice" functions. For example, it implies 
that the sine and cosine functions and the identity function x .,_. x are nearly 
continuous on all of IR. 
Some care is required. For example, the exponential function is its own 
derivative, and Theorem 3.11 says e:r: « oo if and only if x « oo. Hence the 
lemma only implies that x .,_. e:r: is nearly continuous at points x such that 
x « oo. This particular application of the lemma is sharp, as direct calculation 
shows. For unlimited x by 
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we see that this cannot be infinitesimal when y - x is a sufficiently large in-
finitesimal, say, y- x = e-x/2 (the inequality here is the same as the one in the 
proof of Theorem 3.11). 
Thus we see that the exponential function is not (nearly) continuous on all 
of JR, and again we see the analogy between near continuity and conventional 
uniform continuity ( the exponential function is not uniformly continuous on JR 
in conventional mathematics). 
4.3 Summation 
The "radically elementary" analog of infinite series and integrals studied in 
calculus is a sum with an unlimited number of terms. Consider two sums 
V V 
and LYi 
i=l 
When will they be nearly equal? If v is unlimited, then Xi ~ Yi for all i is not 
a sufficient condition. Consider Xi = 1/v and Yi = 2/v. 
A sufficient condition is given by Nelson (1987, Chapter 5). It uses the 
following notion. If x and y are real numbers with y nonzero, we say x is 
asymptotic toy, written x "'y, when x/y ~ 1, in which case xis also nonzero. 
Lemma 4.2. The external relation"' on R \ {O} is an equivalence. 
Proof. Symmetry, x"' x, is obvious. Reflexivity is also obvious, because x/y ~ 1 
implies y/x ~ I. Transitivity is also obvious, becausex/y ~ 1 and y/z ~ 1 imply 
x/z~l. 0 
Then we have the following, which is Theorem 5.3 in Nelson (1987). 
Theorem 4.3. If Xi> 0, Yi> 0, and Xi"' Yi for each i, then 
V V 
LXi rv LYi· (4.4) 
i=l i=l 
Nelson's proof is instructive, so we copy it here. 
Proof Fix e :» 0. Then we have 1 - e ~ xifyi ~I+ e for each i and 
V V V 
(1 - e) L Yi ~ L Xi ~ (1 + e) L Yi· 
i=l i=l i=l 
Hence 
1 - € < E:=l Xi < I + € 
- '°'v -L..,i=l Yi 
(4.5) 
Since e :» O was arbitrary, this implies the fraction in ( 4.5) is nearly equal to 
one, which implies (4.4). D 
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The conclusion of the theorem is not exactly what is wanted. We wanted 
~ in place of,...., in (4.4). The following simple lemma, which is Theorem 5.2 in 
Nelson (1987), usually gives us what we want. 
Lemma 4.4. Suppose x or y is appreciable. Then x,...., y if and only if x ~ y. 
Proof Suppose y is appreciable. First, suppose x ,...., y. Then x/y - 1 is in-
finitesimal, and multiplying by y leaves it infinitesimal. Hence x ~ y. Con-
versely, suppose x ~ y. Then x - y is infinitesimal, and dividing by y leaves it 
infinitesimal. Hence x,...., y. D 
Thus, so long as one side of {4.4) is appreciable, the other side is appreciable 
too, and there is no difference between,...., and~-
4.4 Integration 
The title of this section should be in quotation marks. In "radically elemen-
tary" nonstandard analysis and probability theory, we replace integrals with 
finite sums. But Nelson {1987) often writes sums in a form that makes them 
look like integrals for easy comparison with conventional mathematics. 
Following Nelson {1987, Chapter 9), we use the following notation. Let T 
be a finite subset of JR. Fort ET such that t # max(T), we write dt to mean 
the difference between t and its successor in T, that is, 
dt = min{ u E T: u > t} - t. (4.6) 
Fort= max(T), we adopt the convention dt = 0. We call dt the spacing of T 
at t and collectively refer to these dt as the spacings of T. 
If all the spacings dt are infinitesimal and each t ET is limited, then we say 
Tis a near interval. If all the spacings dt are infinitesimal and min(T) ~ -oo 
and max(T) ~ oo, then we say T is a near line. 
This "dt" notation allows us to write things like 
Le-t212dt~~ 
tET 
when Tis a near line. (This will be proved in this section.) 
(4.7) 
Theorem 4.5. Suppose T is a near interval and suppose f and g are limited-
valued functions on T such that J(t) ~ g(t) for all t ET. Then 
L, J(t) dt ~ LY(t) dt. (4.8) 
tET tET 
Proof Let L be the maximum of all lf(t)I and lg(t)I fort ET. The maximum 
is achieved because Tis finite and hence is limited by assumption. Fix f ~ O 
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T+ = { t ET: /(t) ~ e} 
To = { t E T : If ( t) I < e } 
T_ = { t ET:/ (t) ~ -e} 
Then by Lemma 4.4 we have 
J(t) rv g(t), t ET+ UT_ 
and hence by Theorem 4.3 and Lemma 4.4 again we have 
E 1ct) dt ~ I: g(t) dt 
tET+ tET+ 
and the same with T + replaced by T _. Also 
IL, f(t) dtl ~ L lf(t)I dt ~ e(b - a) tETo tETo 
where a and bare the endpoints of T, and the same with f replaced by g and 
e replaced by 2e, because 1/(x)I ~ e implies lg(x)I ~ 2e. Thus from the triangle 
inequality and the sum of infinitesimals being infinitesimal we obtain 
L,f(t) dt - Lg(t) dtl ;S 3e(b- a) 
tET tET 
Since e » 0 was arbitrary and a and bare limited (by the near interval assump-
tion), this establishes (4.8). D 
Theorem 4.6. Suppose T is a near interval having endpoints a and b, and 
suppose f is a function [a, bJ ~ R that is Riemann integrable, has a limited 
bound, and is nearly continuous on (a, bJ. Then 
L, f(t) dt ~ {b J(t) dt. 
tET la 
Proof Fix e » 0. By definition of Riemann integrability, there exists a subset 
S of R with endpoints a and b such that 
IL 1<s> t1s - t 1<t>t1tl ~ e sES a 
(where ds is the spacing of Sat s), and the same holds when Sis replaced by 
a finer partition, in particular, 
I
L f(u)du- t J(t)dtl ~ e 
uEU a 
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where U =SU T (and where du is the spacing of U at u). 
Define h : U -> JR by 
h(u) = J(t), t E T and t ~ u < t + dt. 
By near continuity off we have /(u) ~ h(u) for u E U, and hence by Theo-
rem 4.5 
L J(u) du~ L h(u) du= L f(t) dt. 
u.EU u.EU tET 
Hence by the triangle inequality, we have 
I~ f(t) dt -lb f(t) dtl ;S €. tET a 
Since e » 0 was arbitrary, this finishes the proof. D 
Corollary 4. 7. Suppose T is a near line and suppose f and g are limited-
valued Junctions on T such that f(t) ~ g(t) for all t E T. Also suppose there 
exist M « oo and a » 1 such that 
lf(t)I ~ Mltl-a, ltl ~ 00 
and similarly with f replaced by g. Then ( 4.8) holds. 
Proof. For any appreciable o we have 
L lf(t)I dt ~ M1-altl-o: dt 
tET -oo 
t<-a 
Llf(t)I dt ~ M 1001t- 01-a dt 
tET a 
t>a 
hence 
2M( o)-<0 - 1> L lf(t)I dt ~ -"--a_-___ _ 
tET (et - l) 
ltl>a 
{4.9) 
(4.10) 
and the right hand side is infinitesimal when a ~ oo because et - 1 is non-
infinitesimal so (a - 0)0 - 1 is the case X"' or XY in the table for powers in 
Section 3.3, hence (a - o)-<0 - 1> is infinitesimal, Mis limited, and 1/(o - 1) is 
limited, and the product is infinitesimal. Similarly {4.10) holds with f replaced 
by g. Fix e » 0. Then 
L 1/(t)I dt ~ e and L·lg(t)I dt ~ e 
tET tET 
ltl>a ltl>a 
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holds for every a ~ oo hence, by overspill, for some limited a. Hence by Theo-
rem 4.5 and the triangle inequality 
I
LJ(t) dt - LY(t) dtl ;S 2€. 
tET tET 
Since € » 0 was arbitrary, this finishes the proof. D 
Corollary 4.8. Suppose T is a near line and suppose f is a function R -> R that 
is absolutely Riemann integrable, has a limited bound, and is nearly continuous 
at each point of T. Also suppose there exist M « oo and a» 1 such that (4.9) 
holds. Then 
'I:, f<t> dt ~ /_00 f<t> dt. 
tET -oo 
Proof As in the preceding proof, condition (4.9) implies 
and the right hand side is infinitesimal when a~ oo. Fix«:» 0. Then 
holds for every a ~ oo hence, by overspill, for some limited a. 
Also by the argument in the preceding proof 
L lf(t)I dt ~ € 
tET 
ltl>a 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
holds for some limited a. Moreover we can choose one limited a so that (4.11) 
and ( 4.12) both hold. 
By Theorem 4.6 
'I:, f<t> dt ~ /_0 f<t> dt. 
tET -a 
1tl$a 
Now apply the triangle inequality and the arbitrariness of «:. D 
The condition (4.9) is not sharp, but a sharp condition, such as asserting 
that the left hand sides of (4.11) and (4.12) are infinitesimal for all a ~ oo, 
would leave a lot of work to be done in applying the corollary. 
The inequality exp(x) ~ 1 + x implies exp(-t2 /2) ~ 2ltl-2• By Lemma 4.1 
t i--. exp(-t2 /2) is nearly continuous, and it is bounded by 1. We know from 
calculus that J~
00 
exp(-t2 /2) dt = .../Frr. Applying the corollary gives (4.7), 
4.5. DERIVABILITY 
4.5 Derivability 
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If T is a subset of IR, then a function g : T --+ R is derivable at the point 
x E T if there exists a limited real number L such that 
g(x2) - g(x1) ~ L, 
X2 -X1 
whenever x1 ~ x ~ x2 and X1 f:- x2 
(it being understood that x1 and x2 are elements of T).2 
(4.13) 
It is clear that an analogous characterization is the following: g is derivable 
at x if there exists a limited real number L such that whenever x1 ~ x and 
h ~ 0 there exists an a ~ 0 such that 
g(x1 + h) - g(x1) = Lh + ah, (4.14) 
(it being understood that x1 and x1 +hare elements ofT). To see the connection 
between the two characterizations take x2 = x 1 + h and a the difference between 
the two sides of (4.13). 
Like other external notions, derivability is different from its internal analog 
( diHerentiability) and is actually a stronger and more useful property. Suppose 
g is derivable at every point of T and we define a limited-real-valued function 
L on T such that 
g(x2) - g(x1) ~ L(x), 
X2 - X1 
whenever x1 ~ x ~ X2 and x1 f:- x2 (4.15) 
(it being understood that x, x1, and x2 are elements of T). Clearly the function 
L is not unique, since it can be changed by an infinitesimal amount at any x 
without affecting the validity of (4.15). However, it is clear from (4.15) that L 
is nearly continuous on T and from (4.14} that g is nearly continuous on T. 
Lemma 4.9. Suppose g is a differentiable function I--+ JR, where I is an open 
interval, and g' is limited and nearly continuous on I. Then g is derivable on I 
and we may take L(x) = g'(x) in (4.15). 
Proof. For x, x1, and x2 in I such that x1 ~ x ~ x2 and x1 # x2, by the mean 
value theorem 
where e is between X1 and X2 and hence { ~ X and g'(e) ~ g'(x) by the near 
continuity assumption. D 
2This notion is taken from Nelson (1977, Section 5). It does not appear in Nelson (1987). 
In Nelson {1977), the formula (4.13) actually defines the derivative g'(x) because for standard 
g and x there is a unique standard L (by the standardization axiom of 1ST), which we denote 
g'(x), that satisfies (4.13) and this implicitly defines derivability for nonstandard g or x (by 
the transfer axiom of IST). Our "radically elementary" nonstandard analysis is too weak to 
do that (havi~g neither standardization nor transfer). 
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Applying both Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.9 we see that a function that has 
two derivatives, both limited on I, is derivable on I. And so most familiar 
functions from calculus are derivable, at least on limited intervals. 
Another way to look at derivability, is to note that when L(x) in (4.15) 
is appreciable then ~ can be replaced by ,v by Lemma 4.4 and the result is 
equivalent to 
whenever x1 ~ x ~ x2 ( 4.16) 
(which, we reiterate, only holds when L(x) is appreciable). 
As an application of this theory, we prove the following useful identity. 
Theorem 4.10. For limited real numbers x and unlimited natural numbers n 
(4.17) 
Proof By (near} continuity of the exponential function, it is enough to show 
n log ( 1 + ~) ~ x. (4.18} 
By derivability of the logarithm function and because its derivative at one is 
appreciable, we have by (4.16) and Lemma 4.9 
log(l + h) ""h, h~o. 
Hence for x and n as in the statement of the theorem, 
n log ( 1 + ~) ,v n · ~ = x 
and this implies ( 4.18) by another application of Lemma 4.4. D 
Part II 
Probability 
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Chapter 5 
Radically Elementary 
Probability Theory 
5.1 Introduction 
Nelson (1987) invented a new formalism for probability theory in which all 
random variables are defined on probability spaces that have 
(i) -finite sample space and 
(ii) no nonempty events of probability zero. 
The main point of (ii) is to assure that conditional probabilities are always well 
defined. When not using conditional probability, it need not be imposed. 
Point (i) implies two other restrictions. 
(iii) We only use finite collections of random variables. Every stochastic process 
has a finite index set. 
(iv) We only use finite families of probability models. Every statistical model 
has a finite parameter space. 
Nelson (1987) uses (iii). Our justification of (iv) is that a likelihood is a stochas-
tic process indexed by the parameter. Hence to obey (iii) the parameter must 
take values in a finite (though perhaps unlimited) set. The need for (iv) is even 
more obvious if one is a Bayesian. If the parameter is a random variable, then 
(i) implies (iv). 
One might think (i) leaves no room for interesting advanced probability 
theory. Under (i) every probability distribution is discrete. There are no truly 
continuous random variables. Also under {i) it is not possible to have an infinite 
sequence of independent random variables ( except for the trivial special case 
where the random variables are constant). 
But Nelson combined this "radical" simplification with an innovation, the 
use of nonstandard analysis. In "Nelson-style" probability theory, a discrete 
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distribution in which every point has infinitesimal probability can behave much 
like a continuous distribution in conventional "Kolmogorov-style" probability 
theory. 
In "Nelson-style" probability theory, a finite sequence X1, ••• , Xn of in-
dependent random variables (which can be defined on a finite sample space), 
where n is unlimited can behave much like an infinite sequence in "Kolmogorov-
style" probability theory. For example, the law of large numbers and the central 
limit theorem can hold for such sequences, where, of course, we are referring to 
"Nelson-style" analogs of the conventional theorems (Nelson, 1987, Chapters 16 
and 18). 
5.2 Unconditional Probability 
5.2.1 Probability 
Probability theory on finite sample spaces having no nonempty events of 
probability zero is very simple. Probability models consist of a finite set n (the 
sample space) and a strictly positive function pr ( the probability mass function) 
on n such that Ewen pr(w) = 1. 
Every subset of n is an event, and the probability of an event A is given by 
Pr(A) = L pr(w). (5.la) 
wEA 
There are never any questions of measurability. 
Note that we distinguish between pr and Pr, the relationship being (5.la) 
going one way and 
pr(w) = Pr( {w}) (5.lb) 
going the other. We can think of Pr as a probability measure. It certainly is the 
Nelson-style analog of a Kolmogorov-style probability measure. However, it is 
much simpler. There is no sigma-algebra (every subset of n is an event). And 
countable additivity is vacuous (since n is finite, there are only finitely many 
events). 
5.2.2 Expectation 
Random Scalars 
A real-valued function on the sample space is called a random variable, and 
the expectation of a random variable X is given by 
E(X) = L X(w) pr(w). (5.2} 
wen 
There are never any questions of existence of expectations. The set of all random 
variables is the finite-dimensional vector space ]Rn. 
5.3. CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY 33 
The indicator function of the set A is the function I A : n ~ JR defined by 
IA(w) = {0, w E f2 \ A 
l, w EA 
(5.3) 
The set n \ A is called the complement of A and is also denoted Ac. Using this 
notation 
Pr(A) = E(IA) 
(probability is expectation of indicator functions). 
Random Vectors 
A function from the sample space n to a vector space V is called a ran-
dom vector and the expectation of a random vector X is given by (5.2) where 
X(w) pr(w) is interpreted as multiplication of the vector X(w) by the scalar 
pr(w) and the sum is interpreted as vector addition, which is well defined be-
cause n is finite. 
The set of all (V-valued} random vectors is yn. Note that even if V is 
infinite-dimensional, it has a finite-dimensional subspace that contains all the 
X(w) for w En because n is finite. Even if we are interested in a finite sequence 
X 1 , ••. , Xn of random variables, there exists a finite dimensional subspace that 
contains all the Xi ( w) for 1 ~ i ~ n and w E n. We shall never be interested in 
infinite sequences or any other infinite collection of random vectors - restriction 
(iii) discussed in Section 5.1. Thus without loss of generality we may assume V 
is finite-dimensional. 
Random Elements 
A function from the sample space n to an arbitrary set Sis called a random 
element of S. The set of all random elements (of S) is s0 . The same sort of 
argument as in the last paragraph of the preceding section says that without 
loss of generality we may take S to be finite. 
Random elements need not have expectations. The addition and multiplica-
tion in (5.2) are not defined for an element X of an abstract set S. But if Xis 
a random element of S and f is a function S ~ IR, then f o X, which is usually 
written J(X), is a random variable and does have expectation. 
5.3 Conditional Probability 
For any family X of random variables define a relation ~ on n by 
(5.4) 
Clearly, this is an internal equivalence relation, and hence defines a partition 
S of n. We write S = at(X) and call the elements of S the atoms of X. By 
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definition, every element of X is constant on each element of S, and Sis the 
coarsest partition of n that has this property. 
The algebra generated by X is the largest family of random variables A 
such that at(A) = at(X). Clearly, it is the set of all random variables that are 
constant on each element of at( X) .1 
An algebra A is closed under arbitrary operations. If/ is a real-valued 
function with d real arguments and X1, ... , Xd are elements of A, then Y = 
f ( X 1 , ... , X d) is also an element of A, where this notation is defined ( as is usual 
in probability theory) by 
Y(w) = f(X1(w), ... ,Xd(w)), 
(This is obvious from the definition.) 
5.3.1 Conditional Expectation 
wE!l. 
Let A be a family ofrandom variables (not necessarily an algebra), and let 
Aw denote the element of at(A) containing w. The conditional expectation of a 
random variable X given the family A is the random variable Y defined by 
Y(w) = p (~ ) L X(w') pr(w'), 
r w w'EAw 
wE!l. (5.5) 
There are never any questions of existence or uniqueness; Pr(Aw) cannot be 
zero because of the assumption that pr is strictly positive. 
Nelson mostly uses the notation E.AX to denote the random variable defined 
by (5.5) but also uses the notation E(XIA) more common in Kolmogorov-style 
theory and also uses the notation E(XIZ1, ... , Zd) when A= {Z1, ... , Zd}-
Theorem 5.1. Suppose A and Bare algebras of random variables and AC B. 
Then 
E.A(X + Y) = E.AX + E.AY, X, YE JR0 
E.A(XY) = X E.AY, X E A, YE ]Rn 
E,AEB = E.A 
EE.A= E 
(5.6a) 
(5.6b) 
(5.6c) 
{5.6d) 
The meaning of {5.6c) or {5.6d) is that the two sides of the equation are 
equal when applied to any random variable. The proofs are straightforward 
verifications directly from the definition {5.5). 
1 Nelson (1987, p. 6) defines algebro differently: a family of random variables containing 
the constant random variables and closed under addition and multiplication. His definition 
is more "mathematical" because it justifies the name "algebra." But he then immediately 
proves that his definition characterizes the same notion as ours. As closure under addition and 
multiplication are not particularly interesting in light of the comments immediately following 
the footnoted text, we just take the characterization more relevant to probability theory as 
our definition. 
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5.3.2 Conditional Probability 
As with unconditional probability, conditional probability is expectation of 
indicator functions: we define conditional probability by 
Pr{BIA) = PrA(B) = EA(lB)- (5.7) 
Consider the special case where A = {IA}, so at(A) = {A, Ac}. Then for 
w E A so Aw = A, the definition (5.5) gives 
1 Pr(AnB) 
Pr(A) L IB(w) pr{w) = Pr(A) 
wEA 
for the value of Pr{BIA) at such an w. 
As in undergraduate probability theory we write this 
p (BIA) = Pr(A n B) 
r Pr{A) {5.8) 
and regard it as an independent definition of what Pr(BI ·) means when the 
thingy behind the bar is an event rather than a family of random variables. 
Clearly, (5.8) is well defined whenever A is nonempty {because of our rule that 
nonempty events have nonzero probability). 
It is clear that Pr(BIA) evaluated at an w E Ac is Pr(BIAc). Moreover, for 
any family of random variables A (not just ones generated by a single indicator 
function), we have 
Pr(BIA)(w) = Pr(BIAw) 
where the notation on the left hand side means the random variable Pr{BIA) 
evaluated at the point w and, as in the definition (5.5), Aw is the element of at(A) 
containing w. And this connects the two notions of conditional probability: the 
undergraduate level (5.8) and the PhD level (5.7), at least "PhD level" when 
done Kolmogorov-style, our Nelson-style definition using (5.5) being actually 
only undergraduate level in difficulty. 
Although one does not usually see the "PhD level" definition (5. 7) of con-
ditional probability in undergraduate courses, one does see the so-called regres-
sion function E(YIX 1 , ... , Xp) without which one cannot understand multiple 
regression. Of course, it is usually introduced without having the PhD level 
Kolmogorov-style definition that makes it rigorous. Our Nelson-style definition 
serves just as well to make the concept rigorous and is much lower in level of 
difficulty. 
5.4 Distribution Functions 
A random variable X induces a distribution function F defined by 
F(x) = Pr(X ~ x), XE JR {5.9a) 
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and probability mass function f defined by 
J(x) = Pr(X = x), 
These are related by 
X EJR. 
f(x) = F(x) - maxF(y) 
y<x 
and 
a relation denoted by f = dF. 
F(x) = L J(y), 
yER 
y$x 
(5.9b) 
{5.9c) 
(5.9d) 
The sum in {5.9d) is always well defined because of the assumption (i) of 
Section 5.1 that all random variables are defined on finite sample spaces so f(y) 
is zero for all but finitely many y. This implies that Fis a step function with 
only finitely many jumps. We say that the set of y such that f(y) is positive is 
the support off and also the support of F. 
If his a real-valued function on IR and X is a: random variable having dis-
tribution function F, then we can write 
E{h(X)} = Lh(x)dF(x). (5.9e) 
xER 
Here too, the sum is always well defined because of the assumption of finite 
support. 
Recall the notation introduced in Section 4.4 in which Tis a finite subset of 
IR and dt denotes the spacings of T. 
Lemma 5.2. If F is the distribution function of a nonnegative random variable 
and T is a subset of (0, oo) containing zero and the support of F { and perhaps 
other points), then 
E(X) = L[l - F(t)] dt. (5.10) 
tET 
Proof. 
E(X) = LxdF(x) 
xEIR 
= LL dtdF(x) 
xERtET 
t<x 
= LL dF(x)dt 
tETxER 
:r>t 
= L[l - F(t)] dt 
tET 
0 
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5.5 Probability Measures 
A random element X of a set S induces a probability measure P defined by 
P(A) = Pr(X EA), AcS (5.lla) 
and probability mass function p defined by 
p(x) = Pr(X = x), XE S. {5.llb) 
These are related by 
p(x)=P({x}) (5.llc) 
and 
P(A) = Lp(x), (5.lld) 
xES 
a relation denoted by p = dP. This relationship between X and Pis denoted 
P = .C(X), and we say P is the law of X. 
The sum in (5.1 ld) is always well defined, even if Sis an infinite set, because 
of the assumption (i) of Section 5.1 that all random elements are de.fined on finite 
sample spaces so p(x) is zero for all but finitely many x. We say that the set of 
x such that p(x) is positive is the support of p and also the support of P. We 
shall never be interested in measures that do not have finite support. 
If h is a real-valued function on S, X is a random element of S, and P = 
.C(X), then we can write 
E{h(X)} = L h(x) dP(x). (5.lle) 
xES 
As with (5.lld), the sum in (5.lle) is always well defined because of the as-
sumption that P has finite support. 
Chapter 6 
More Radically Elementary 
Probability Theory 
6.1 Almost Surely 
The definition of "almost surely" appropriate in Nelson-style probability 
theory (Nelson, 1987, Chapter 7) goes as follows: a property A holds almost 
surely if for every€» 0 there exists an event N (which may depend on€) such 
that Pr(N) ~€and A(w) is true except for w EN. 
If the property A in question is internal, then the event 
{ w En: A(w)} {6.1) 
has probability nearly equal to one, which more resembles the conventional 
(Kolmogorov-style) definition. 
But if the property A is extema~ then ( 6.1) is an instance of illegal set 
formation (Section 2.4). It need not define a set, and hence need not have a 
probability. Thus we need the more complicated definition involving a different 
exception set N for every € » 0 when we want to say an external property holds 
almost surely. 
Lemma 6.1. Suppose A1 , ... , An are properties that hold almost surely and n 
is limited. Then A1 , ... , An hold simultaneously almost surely. 
Proof For every€» 0, we have E/n » 0, hence there exist events Ni such that 
Pr(Ni) ~ E/n and Ai(w) holds except for w E Ni. But then Pr(LJ~=I Ni) ~ f 
and and Ai(w) holds for i = 1, ... , n, except for w E U~1 Ni. D 
6.1.1 Infinitesimal Almost Surely 
When the property A in question is X ~ 0, the last bit of the definition of 
almost surely becomes: and X(w) ~ 0 except for w EN. 
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Lemma 6.2. The following three conditions are equivalent. 
(i) X is infinitesimal almost surely. 
(ii) If A» 0, then Pr(IXI ~ A) ~ O. 
(iii) There exists a A~ 0 such that Pr(IXI ~ A) ~ 0. 
This is Theorem 7.1 in Nelson (1987). We do not give a proof here. The 
proof is very similar to that of the lemma in the next section. 
6.1.2 Limited Almost Surely 
When the property A in question is IXI « oo, the last bit of the definition 
of almost surely becomes: and IX(w)I « oo except for w EN. 
Lemma 6.3. The following three conditions are equivalent. 
(i) X is limited almost surely. 
(ii) If x ~ oo, then Pr(IXI ~ x) ~ 0. 
(iii) For every f » 0 there exists a limited x such that Pr(IXI ~ x) ::; f. 
Proof. Assume (i). Then for every € » 0 there exists an event N_ such that 
X(w) is limited except when w E N. Hence if x ~ oo the event IXI ~ xis 
contained in N, and Pr(IXI 2:: x) ::; f. Since € was arbitrary, (ii) holds. Thus 
(i) ~ (ii). 
Assume (ii). Fix € » 0. Then Pr(IXI 2:: x) ::; € holds for all unlimited 
positive x, hence by overspill for some limited x. Thus (ii) ~ (iii). 
(iii) ~ (i) is obvious. D 
The concept in Kolmogorov-style probability theory analogous to "limited 
almost surely" is "tight." In Kolmogorov-style theory, tightness is an uninter-
esting concept when applied to single random variables, because by countable 
additivity every random variable is tight. 
In conventional finitely-additive probability theory, non-tight random vari-
ables exist, although proof of their existence involves fancy mathematics like 
the Hahn-Banach theorem. In Nelson-style probability theory, random vari-
ables that are not limited almost surely are easily constructed. For example; 
take the (discrete) uniform distribution on the integers 1, ... , n, where n is 
unlimited. 
6.2 L1 Random Variables 
In Nelson-style theory, every random variable has a well defined expectation 
given by (5.2). But, unlike the situation in Kolmogorov-style probability theory, 
the mere existence of expectation proves nothing (since every random variable 
has expectation, existence is vacuous). 
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One might guess that the Nelson-style property analogous to Kolmogorov-
style existence of expectation is limited absolute expectation, but it turns out 
that an even stronger property is needed for a random variable to be ''well 
behaved." 
A random variable X is £ 1 if E(IXIIca,oo)(IXI)) nearly converges to zero as 
a goes to infinity, meaning 
E(IXllca,oo)(IXI)) ~ 0, a~oo. (6.2) 
The analogous Kolmogorov-style definition is easily seen to define £ 1 . If 
X is a Kolmogorov-style random variable that has expectation, then the left 
hand side of (6.2) converges to zero as a-+ oo by dominated convergence. On 
the other hand, if X is a Kolmogorov-style random variable that does not have 
expectation, then the left hand side of (6.2) is equal to +oo for all a, because if 
there existed an a for which the left hand side was finite, then we would have 
E(IXI) = E{IXIJ(O,a](IXI)) + E{IXIJ(a,oo)(IXI)) 
~a+ E{IXIIca,oo)(IXI)) 
finite, contrary to assumption. 
6.2.1 The Radon-Nikodym Theorem 
We don't usually use the definition of £ 1 directly. More often we use the 
following characterization, which is Theorem 8.1 in Nelson (1987). 
Theorem 6.4 (Radon-Nikodym and converse). A random variable X is L1 
if and only if E(IXI) is limited and, for all events M, if Pr(M) ~ 0, then 
E(IXIIM) ~ 0. 
Thus we see that £ 1 is a stronger property than limited absolute expectation 
(however, see Theorem 6.8 below for a criterion based on limitedness of higher 
moments). Here is an example of a random variable X that has limited absolute 
expectation, but is not L1• Let X be Bernoulli(p) and Y = bX with b > 0. Then 
Y is nonnegative, so we may omit absolute values. 
E(YI (Y)) = {bp, a< b 
(a,oo) 0, a ~ b 
so, if b ~ oo and bp > 0, then Y is not £ 1• But E(Y) = bp, so if bp « oo, then 
Y does have limited absolute expectation. For example, take p = 1/b. 
The name of the theorem comes from Nelson (1987). He often labels his 
theorems with names of theorems from Kolmogorov-style theory. The names 
don't mean that his theorem is the same as the Kolmogorov-style theorem (or 
even a corollary of it). Rather they mean that his theorem is the analog in his 
theory of the named theorem in Kolmogorov-style theory. 
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In this case the analogy is the following. Suppose (0, A, P) is a Kolmogorov-
style probability space and X a Kolmogorov-style L1 ( P) random variable on this 
probability space. Define a positive measure v on (0, A) by 
v(A) = llXldP. 
Then P(M) = 0 implies v(M) = 0, a property called absolute continuity of 
v with respect to Pin Kolmogorov-style theory, which is the condition in the 
Radon-Nikodym theorem. The condition in the Nelson-style Radon-Nikodym 
theorem is P(M) ~ 0 implies v(M) ~ 0. 
Unlike the situation in conventional mathematics (Lebesgue-style measure 
theory as well as Kolmogorov-style probability theory) L 1 is not a vector space. 
It is not even a set. The following 
{ X E lRn : X is L1 } (6.3) 
is illegal set formation because L1 is an external property. In fact, we can prove 
that there does not exist a subset S of Rn such that X E S if and only if X is 
£ 1 , because if this set did exist, then by Theorem 6.4, letting Y be the constant 
random variable everywhere equal to one, 
{a ER: aY ES} 
would be the set of limited real numbers, which does not exist (Theorem 3.13). 
However, it immediately follows from Theorem 6.4 that 
X and Y are L 1 ~ X + Y is £ 1 
X is L1 and lal « oo ~ aX is £ 1 
Y is L1 and IXI ~ IYI ~Xis £ 1 
(6.4a) 
(6.4b} 
(6.4c) 
so Nelson-style £ 1 behaves much like Kolmogorov-style £ 1. The differences are 
that Kolmogorov-style theory would allow unlimited a in (6.4b) and would allow 
IXI ~ IYI to hold only almost surely in (6.4c). 
In Nelson-style theory we cannot insert "almost surely" in (6.4c) if there 
exists any point w having infinitesimal probability (that is, whenever "almost 
surely" is not vacuous), because if Xis £ 1 and we define Ya to be equal to X 
everywhere except at w where we have Y0 (w) = a, then EY0 -+ oo as a-+ co 
and hence Y0 is not £ 1 for sufficiently large a, but Ya~ X almost surely. 
6.2.2 The Lebesgue Theorem 
Another important theorem about £ 1 is the following, which it gets its name 
because it is the Nelson-style analog of the Lebesgue dominated convergence 
theorem, monotone convergence theorem, and Fatou's lemma. It is Theorem 8.2 
in Nelson (1987). 
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Theorem 6.5 (Lebesgue). If X and Y are L1 and X ~ Y almost surely, then 
E(X) ~ E(Y). 
Note that.what is a convergence in Kolmogorov-style theory has become an 
external equivalence relation in Nelson-style theory. This is typical. As we shall 
see, the same thing happens with convergence in probability and convergence 
in distribution. 
How can this one simple Nelson-style theorem replace all of that Lebesgue-
Kolmogorov-style theory? In Nelson-style theory, we only look at finite se-
quences, and existence and uniqueness of limits are not at issue: we can always 
take the limit to be the last element of the sequence but the limit is never 
unique. Nor can it be an issue to prove that the limit is L1. By the comment 
following and concerning (6.4c), we can never prove a limit to be L1 because all 
random variables almost surely equal to the limit are also limits but many of 
them are not L 1• Thus the only part of the dominated, monotone, and Fatou 
convergence theorems that is of interest is that almost sure convergence implies 
convergence of expectations, and this is assured by Theorem 6.5. Nelson-style 
theory is in some respects much simpler than the competition. 
Lemma 6.6. Let Z be a nonnegative random variable. If E(Z) ~ 0, then Z ~ 0 
almost surely. Conversely, if Z is L1 and Z ~ 0 almost surely, then E(Z) ~ 0. 
Proof One direction is the Lebesgue theorem. The other direction is Markov's 
inequality. 
Pr(Z > ,\) S E\Z). (6.5) 
If E( Z) ~ 0, then for every ,\ » 0 the right hand side of ( 6.5) is infinitesimal 
over non-infinitesimal equals infinitesimal. Hence by criterion (ii) of Lemma 6.2 
Z ~ 0 almost surely. D 
This lemma is the Nelson-style analog of the Kolmogorov-style theorem that 
a nonnegative random variable Z is zero almost surely if and only if E(Z) = 0. 
For any random variable X and any positive real number a define another 
random variable 
{
-a, X(w) < -a 
x<0 >(w) = X(w), -a~ X(w) ~ a 
a, X(w) > a 
(6.6) 
Lemma 6.7 (Approximation). Suppose X and Y are L 1 random variables and 
EX(a) ~ EY(a) for all limited a. Then EX ~ EY. 
Proof. For every E » 0 we have 
IEX - Ex<0 >1 ~ € and IEY -EY<0 >1 ~ € (6.7) 
for all unlimited a and hence by overspill for some limited a. But for this a we 
have EX(a) ~ EY(a) and hence by the triangle inequality 
IEX - EYI ~ 3€. (6.8} 
Since (6.8) holds for every€» 0, the left hand side must be infinitesimal. D 
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6.2.3 LP Random Variables 
For 1 ~ p < oo, we say a random variable X is LP if IXIP is £ 1 , and we 
say a random variable Xis L00 if it is limited, that is, if IX(w)I « oo for all w 
(Nelson, 1987, p. 31). And for such variables we define the norms 
(6.9a) 
when 1 ~ p < oo and 
IIXlloo = maxlX(w)j. 
wEO 
(6.9b) 
In {6.9b) we can write "max" instead of "sup" (the supremum is achieved) 
because n is a finite set. Hence, if X is £ 00 , then IIXll 00 is limited. The 
analogous property, if X is LP, then IIX IIP is limited, holds for 1 ~ p « oo 
because the expectation in (6.9a) is limited by the Radon-Nikodym theorem. 
Theorem 6.8. Suppose 1 ~ p « q « oo and E(IXlq) « oo, then X is LP. 
Proof. First 
'
XIP- IXlq 
- IXlp(q/p-1) 
from which we obtain 
and 
E{IXIP I (IXIP)} < E{IXlq}. (a,oo) - aq/p-1 
Now q/p - 1 = (q - p)/p is appreciable over appreciable equals appreciable, 
hence aqfp-l ~ oo whenever a~ oo. Since E{IXlq} « oo, we have 
a~ oo, 
so IXIP is L1 and X is LP. D 
6.2.4 Conditional Expectation 
There are two important theorems about L1 and conditional expectation 
(Theorems 8.3 and 8.4 in Nelson, 1987) which are repeated here below. 
Theorem 6.9. If 1 :5 p ~ oo and X is LP and A is a family of random 
variables, then EAX is LP. 
Theorem 6.10. If X is L1 and A is a family of random variables, then X is 
L1 on almost every atom of A. 
6.2. L 1 RANDOM VARIABLES 45 
The meaning of Theorem 6.10 is not entirely obvious. It means that for 
every e » 0 there exists a set N, which in this case may be taken to be a union 
of atoms of A, such that Pr(N) ::; e and 
a~oo (6.10) 
except on N {the conditional expectation is an element of A, hence constant on 
atoms of A and the assertion is that {6.10) holds except on those atoms of A 
that are contained in N). 
Theorem 6.11 (Conditional Lebesgue). If X and Y are L1 random variables 
such that X ~ Y almost surely and A is a family of random variables, then 
E(X I A)~ E(Y I A) almost surely. 
Proof. Let Z = X - Y. Then Z is L1 and Z ~ 0 almost surely. We are to 
show that E(Z I A) ~ 0 almost surely. Define W = E(Z I A). W is L 1 by 
Theorem 6.9. By the conditional Jensen inequality {Nelson, 1987, p. 8) and 
iterated conditional expectation {5.6d) 
E(IWI) = E[IE(Z I B)I] ::; E[E(IZI I B)] = E(IZI). {6.11) 
Now Z is L 1 if and only if IZI is by definition of L1 and Z is infinitesimal almost 
surely if and only if IZI is because a number z is infinitesimal if and only if lzl is. 
Hence IZI is L1 and infinitesimal almost surely, so by Lemma 6.6 E(IZI) ~ 0. 
Hence (6.11) implies E(IWI) ~ 0, and by the other direction of Lemma 6.6 IWI 
is infinitesimal almost surely, so W is infinitesimal almost surely. D 
6.2.5 The Fubini Theorem 
Why do we have a section with this title? If expectations are always fi-
nite sums, isn't it obvious that we can interchange the order of summation? 
Yes, it is. But the Fubini theorem in Kolmogorov-style probability theory also 
makes measurability and integrability assertions (some authors put these in a 
preliminary lemma). The measurability assertions are vacuous in Nelson-style 
probability theory, but the integrability assertions are still important ( Corollary 
to Theorem 8.4 in Nelson, 1987, repeated below). 
Theorem 6.12 (Fubini). Suppose X is L1 on a probability space with n = 
!'21 x 02 and pr((w1,w2)} = pr1(w1)pr2 (w2), then for pr2 almost all w2 in fh 
the random variable w1 i-+ X(w1,w2} on (01, pr1} is L1 • 
· Chapter 7 
Stochastic Convergence 
7.1 Almost Sure Convergence 
A sequence X 1 , ••• , Xv ofrandom variables converges almost surely (Nelson, 
1987, p. 26) if almost surely 
n ::::'. oo. (7.1) 
More precisely, for every E » 0 there exists an event N (which may depend on 
e) such that Pr( N) ~ E and 
n ::::'. oo, w ¢ N. 
7.2 Convergence in Probability 
A sequence X 1 , .•. , Xv of random variables converges in probability (Nelson, 
1987, p. 26) if 
Xn ::::'. Xv almost surely, n::::'.oo. (7.2) 
More precisely, for every n ~ oo and e » 0 there exists an event N (which may 
depend on n and E) such that Pr( N) ~ e and 
Xn(w) ~ Xv(w), w¢N. 
7.3 Almost Sure Near Equality 
Let us define a notation for X ~ Y almost surely. Random variables X and 
Y are nearly equal almost surely, written X ~ Y, if X ::::'. Y holds almost surely. 
Using this notation, we can redefine convergence in probability, replacing 
{7.2): a sequence ... converges in probability if 
n~oo. 
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Lemma 7.1. The external relation~ is an equivalence on JR0 . 
Proof Symmetry and reflexivity come from the corresponding properties of~. 
If X ~ Y and Y ~ Z, then X ~ Z by Corollary 3.9 and Lemma 6.1. D 
Note that the situation here is much like what we saw with (near) conver-
gence of non-random sequences in Section 4.1. The sequence does very little 
work. It is enough to understand the external equivalence relation almost sure 
near equality. We never need to deal with the whole sequence; we always deal 
with two elements at a time (is Xm ~ Xv or not?) 
It is also much like what we saw with the Lebesgue theorem in Section 6.2.2 
replacing conventional theorems about sequences ( monotone convergence, dom-
inated convergence, Fatou). 
The only forms of stochastic convergence in which necessarily involve se-
quences are almost sure convergence (Section 7 .1 above) and the invariance 
principle (Nelson, 1987, Theorem 18.1), both of which are sample path limit 
theorems. The point is that in (7 .1) the exception sets must work for all un-
limited n, whereas in (7.2) one may use different exception sets for each n. So 
(7.1) is a statement about the whole sequence and (7.2) isn't. 
7.4 Near Equivalence 
A real-valued function g is limited if every value is limited. Random variables 
X and Y defined on possibly different probability spaces are nearly equivalent 
(Nelson, 1987, Chapter 17), written X ~ Y, if 
E{g(X)} ~ E{g(Y)} 
for every limited (nearly) continuous function g. 
Lemma 7.2. The external relation~ is an equivalence. 
Proof Obvious from~ being an equivalence. 
7.5 Convergence in Distribution 
D 
A sequence X 1 , ... , Xv of random variables defined on possibly different 
probability spaces converges in distribution (also called ''weak convergence" or 
"convergence in law"), if 
n~oo. (7.3) 
The situation here is much like what we have seen · with every other form 
of convergence of sequences with the sole exception of almost sure convergence. 
The sequence does very little work. It is enough to understand the external 
equivalence relation near equivalence. We never need to deal with the whole 
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sequence; we always deal with two elements at a time (is Xm ~ Xv or not?) 
There is so little point to convergence in distribution ( over and above near 
equivalence) that Nelson (1987) does not even bother to define it. 
As we saw with (near) convergence of non-random sequences in Section 4.1, 
and for exactly the same reasons, Nelson-style convergence in distribution is a 
much stronger property than Kolmogorov-style convergence in distribution. We 
have, for instance, the same behavior of double sequences 
i =:::! 00 
j =:::! 00 
implies 
i,j, m, n =:! oo. 
That's just the way equivalence relations behave. 
The analogous property does not hold for Kolmogorov-style convergence in 
distribution (it doesn't even hold when all the random variables are constant 
random variables and the convergence in distribution is convergence of non-
random sequences in disguise). 
Now it might be that Nelson-style convergence in distribution is too strong? 
Maybe it is hard to get? But it turns out this is not the case. We get near equiva-
lence when we expect to get it in situations analogous to when Kolmogorov-style 
convergence in distribution occurs. Thus it seems that Kolmogorov-style con-
vergence in distribution is too weak. Nelson-style arguments are often simpler 
and easier. 
Theorem 7.3. The following are the only implications that hold between the 
various modes of stochastic convergence. 
(i) A sequence of random variables that converges almost surely also converges 
in probability. 
(ii) A sequence of random variables that converges in probability also converges 
in distribution. 
(iii) X ~ Y implies X ~ Y. 
(The reverse implications are, in general, false.) 
Proof. (i) is obvious from the definitions. (iii) obviously implies (ii).- Every 
limited function is £ 1 by the Radon-Nikodym theorem (our Theorem 6.4) and 
hence (iii) holds by the Lebesgue theorem (our Theorem 6.5). 
The converses to (ii) and (iii) need not hold, because X ~ Y does not even 
require that X and Y be defined on the same probability space, and X ~ Y 
does. Moreover, consider X having the uniform distribution on the two-point 
set {-1, 1} and Y = -X, then X ~ Y is true, but X ~ Y is false. 
Nelson (1987, p. 26) gives a counterexample to the converse to (i). Let X 1, 
... , X,, be independent and identically distributed Bernoulli random variables 
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with Pr(Xn = 1) = c/v, where vis unlimited and c is appreciable. Note that, 
since Xn is zero-or-one-valued, we have Xn ~ 0 if and only if Xn = 0. Since c/v 
as is infinitesimal, we have Xn ~ 0 for all n. Hence Xn converges in probability to 
zero. 
Let Aµ denote the event 
Xm=O, 
Then ( c)v-µ Pr(Aµ) = 1--;; 
and if v - µ is unlimited, we have 
Pr(A,.) c:e exp (-c · v: µ) (7.4) 
by Theorem 4.10. 
This makes it impossible for Xn to converge almost surely to zero, because 
this requires that for every unlimitedµ we have Pr(Aµ) ~ 1- f for every f » 0, 
hence Pr(Aµ) ~ 1, which happens only if the argument of the exponential 
function in (7.4) is infinitesimal for all unlimitedµ, and this is not so. D 
Chapter 8 
The Central Limit Theorem 
8.1 Independent and Identically Distributed 
Nelson (1987, Chapter 18 and also the discussion on p. 57) gives a theorem 
that has the following obvious corollary. 
Corollary 8.1 (The Central Limit Theorem). Suppose X 1 , X2, .. . , Xv are 
independent and identically distributed L2 random variables with mean µ and 
variance u2 , and suppose u 2 » 0 and v ~ oo. Define 
Then the random variable 
- } V 
Xv=-LXi. 
V 
i=l 
Z=Xv-µ, 
u/vv 
is L2 and nearly equivalent to every other such random variable. 
(8.1) 
The assertion of the theorem is that, no matter what independent and iden-
tically distributed L2 sequence with appreciable variance is chosen, the distri-
bution of (8.1) is the same up to near equivalence. 
We say any random variable nearly equivalent to (8.1) is standard nonnal. 
Note that in Nelson-style theory the term "standard normal" does not name a 
distribution. It is an external property that distributions may or may not have. 
As with any external property, it is illegal set formation to try to form the set 
of all standard normal distributions (this set does not exist). 
8.2 The De Moivre-Laplace Theorem 
In this section we find out more about the limiting distribution in the cen-
tral limit theorem. The Bernoulli distribution with success probability p has 
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probability mass function 
f(k) = {q, k = 0 
p, k= 1 
where q = 1 - p. This distribution is abbreviated Bernoulli(p). 
The binomial distribution for n trials with success probability p has proba-
bility mass function 
k=O, ... ,n. (8.2) 
This is the distribution of the sum of n IID Bernoulli(p) random variables. This 
distribution is abbreviated Binomial(n,p). 
Theorem 8.2 {De Moivre-Laplace). Suppose X has the Binomial(n,p) distri-
bution wi,th 
n=::! oo 
0«p«1 
and 
Z- X-np 
- ,lnpq . 
Then there exists a near line T such that 
Pr(Z ~ z):::: - 1-~ e-t2 / 2 dt. 
v27r tET 
t~z 
Our proof closely follows Feller (1950, Section 7.2). 
Proof. Stirling's approximation for nf is 
(8.3a) 
(8.3b) 
(8.4) 
(27r)I/2nn+I/2e-n ~ nf ~ (21r)l/2nn+I/2e-n+I/(12n) (B.5) 
(Feller, 1950, pp. 41-44)1 Dividing through by the left hand term in (8.5) gives 
1 < nf < el/(12n) 
- (21r)l/2nn+I/2e-n - (8.6) 
From the continuity of the exponential function for limited values of its 
argument, we conclude 1 :::: e1!<12n) whenever 1/(12n) is infinitesimal, which 
is whenever n is unlimited. Thus a nonstandard analysis version of Stirling's 
approximation is 
n::::oo. (8.7) 
1 ActualJy, Feller's argument at this point in his book only establishes (8.5) with the factor 
(21r)1l 2 replaced by an unknown constant. It is only toward the end of the proof of the De 
Moivre-Laplace theorem that we find out, by comparison with the normalizing constant for 
the normal distribution, what this unknown constant is. (See footnote 3.) 
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Interestingly, Feller uses the same rv notation in his equation for Stirling's ap-
proximation, but, of course, he means something conventional (that the ratio of 
the two sides converges to one as n goes to infinity). 
Plugging Stirling's approximation into (8.2} gives 
(21r )1f2nn+I/2e-npkqn-k 
rv--~~--'----...,.,....------,...-.,---{21r)l/2kk+l/2e-k{21r)lf2(n _ kt-k+1/2e-<n-k) 
l nn+I/2pkqn-k 
= (21r)1/2 . kk+I/2(n - kt-k+I/2 
= c,rk(: _ k)r- (n:t V'! k rk 
whenever k ~ oo and n-k '.:::: oo [this is our analog of equation (2.5) in Chapter 7 
of Feller (1950)}. 
Now (still following Feller) we define o = k - np so k = np + 8 and n - k = 
nq- c5 and 
( n ) 
1
1
2 
1 
f(k) rv 21r(np + c5)(nq - c5) • ( c5 )np+o ( c5 )nq-o 
1+- 1--
np nq 
{8.8) 
{this is our analog of equation (2.7) in Chapter 7 of Feller (1950)]. 
For c5 = 0 the right hand side is exactly 1/-/21rnpq. For c5 ¥- 0 we use the 
two-term Taylor series in T/ = c5 /n with remainder to expand the logarithm of 
the denominator of the second term 
[( 
0 )np+o ( 0 )nq-6] log 1+- 1--
np nq 
where p* = p+ c5* /n, q* = 1 - p*, and lo*I 5 joj. 
By (8.3b) the term 1/p*2 -1/q*2 on the right hand side is limited when o/n 
is infinitesimal and hence we have 
whenever 
[( 
0 )np+cS( 0 )nq-6] 02 log 1+- 1-- rv--
. np nq 2npq 
c5 
- '.::::0 
n 
{8.9a) 
(8.9b) 
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[these are our analogs of equations {2.9) and {2.10) in Chapter 7 of Feller 
{1950)}.2• Equation {8.9b) together with n ~ oo implies both k ~ oo and 
n - k ~ oo. Thus the only conditions required for (8.8) and {8.9a) to hold are 
(8.3a), (8.3b), and (8.9b}. 
Still following Feller, (8.9b} together with (8.3b) implies np + o"' np and 
nq - o"' nq. Hence the first term on the right hand side in (8.8) is asymptotic 
to 1/ J21rnpq, and 
f(k) rv (-1 ) 
112 
exp (-__!_) 21rnpq 2npq (8.10) 
(this is our analog of equation (2.11) in Chapter 7 of Feller (1950)). 
We now leave Feller and do some "calculus" nonstandard analysis style. We 
know from conventional probability theory that we should be interested in the 
standardized variable 
k-np 
z=--Jniiq 
in terms of which 
k = np+ z/niiq 
and 
o = zvn-fiq 
Note that z takes values in the near line 
T = { (k - np)E: k = 0, ... ,n} 
with regular spacing E = 1/ Jniiq, which by (8.3a) and (8.3b) is infinitesimal. 
Rewriting (8.10} in terms of z gives 
f(k)"' ~e-z2 / 2 dz= <p(z) dz 
v21r 
(8.11) 
where dz = e is the spacing of T and <p is the standard normal density function 
from conventional probability theory. 3 
Now for any limited numbers a and b with a< b we have by Theorem 4.3 
Pr(a < Z < b) rv L </J(z)dz 
zET 
a<z<b 
because, if z is limited and (8.3a) and (8.3b) hold, then 
~=z fiiq 
n y-:;;: 
(8.12) 
2Our (8.9b) is simpler than Feller's (2.10) because our ,..., relation is simpler than his 
(because we are using nonstandard analysis). 
3 As mentioned in footnote 1 of this chapter, Feller's argument establishing (8.7) leaves the 
constant (21r)112 undetermined, and this is the same constant as the vii in (8.11). Now we 
see that, since the /(k) must sum to one, by (4.7), which was proved by Corollary 4.8 and the 
discussion following it, the unknown constant must be nearly equal to ,,/'Im. 
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is infinitesimal, hence {8.9b) holds and hence also {8.11). Actually, we have 
Pr(a < Z < b) ~ L </>(z)dz 
zET 
a<z<b 
(8.13) 
because the left hand side of (8.12), being less than one, is limited and, if appre-
ciable, nearly equal to the right hand side by Lemma 4.4, and, if infinitesimal, 
nearly equal to the right hand side by the definition of rv. 
Now we know from conventional probability theory (or can easily calculate) 
that E( Z) = 0 and var( Z) = 1. It then follows from Chebyshev's inequality 
(Nelson, 1987, p. 5) that 
1 
Pr{IZI 2: a) ~ 2 . a 
Hence Z is limited almost surely, and by Lemma 6.3 for any e » 0 there exists 
a limited a such that Pr(IZI 2: a) ~ e. Hence for limited b 
Pr(Z < b)- L¢(z)dz ;S € 
zET 
z<b 
and, since € » 0 was arbitrary, we have (8.4) for all limited z. Because Z is 
limited almost surely, both sides of (8.4) are infinitesmal when z ~ -oo and 
nearly equal to one when z ~ +oo. 0 
Corollary 8.3. For any near line T, the distribution having distribution func-
tion F defined by 
where 
is standard normal, and 
for all z E JR. 
c= Le-t2/2dt, 
tET 
F(z) ~ - e-t /2 dt 1 /_z 2 
.J'2-rr -oo 
Proof Apply Corollary 4.8. D 
Later, after we have learned more about distribution functions and near 
equivalence, we will improve this corollary to an "if and only if' statement 
{Corollary 10.6). 
Chapter 9 
Near Equivalence in Metric 
Spaces 
9.1 Metric Spaces 
Let ( S, d) be a metric space, that is, S is a set and d is a metric for S. 
We say points x and y of Sare nearly equal and write x ~ y when d(x, y) is 
infinitesimal. Note that our definition of x ~ y in Ht is a special case of this 
generalization when we use the usual metric for JR defined by d(x, y) = Ix -yl. 
Let ( S, d) and ( S', d') be metric spaces. A function h : S ~ S' is nearly 
continuous at a point x E S if 
y E Sand x ~ y --+ h(x) ~ h(y), (9.1) 
and nearly continuous on a set TC S if (9.1) holds at all x ET. 
Random elements X and Y of a metric space ( S, d) defined on possibly 
different probability spaces are nearly equivalent written X ~ Y, if 
E{g(X)} ~ E{g(Y)} 
for every limited (nearly) continuous function g : S ~ JR. 
Let d1 and d2 be two different metrics for the same set· S. We say that d1 
and d2 are equivalent if they agree as to the meaning of x ~ y, that is, if 
In this case, a function h : S ~ S' where (S', d') is another metric space is 
(nearly) continuous when d1 is the metric for S if and only if it is continuous 
when· d2 is the metric. In this sense, near equivalence of random elements of 
metric spaces does not depend on the metric but only on the external equivalence 
relation ~ induced by the metric. 
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9.2 Probability Measures 
A random element X of a metric space ( S, d) induces a probability measure 
P defined by (5.lla) and probability mass function p defined by (5.llb), a 
relation denoted by p = dP. This relationship between X and P is denoted 
P = .C(X), and we say Pis the law of X. 
Since near equivalence is determined by expectations, and expectations are 
determined by measures, near equivalence really depends only on measures not 
on random elements (except through their measures). Thus we make the defi-
nition: measures P and Q on a metric space (having finite support) are nearly 
equivalent, written P ~ Q if Ph ~ Qh for every limited nearly continuous 
function h: S-> JR, where 
Ph= L h(x)dP(x) 
xeS 
is a shorthand for the expectation of the random variable h(X) when P = .C(X). 
9.3 The Prohorov Metric 
If d is a metric on S we define the notation 
d(x, A) = inf d(x, y) 
yEA 
for any nonempty subset A of S. Then we define the notation 
Af = { x E S: d(x, A) < e} 
for any nonempty subset A of S and any f > O. For completeness, we define 
0f = 0 fore > Q. Note that the "open" ball of radius e centered at x can be 
denoted { x }e, and our definition for the empty set makes 
hold for all A (rather than just nonempty A). The set Ae is called the £-dilation 
of A. 
The triangle inequality implies (AE)'1 c Ae+71 because z E (AE)'1 when there 
exist x EA and y ES such that d(x, y) < f and d(y, z) < 77. 
Let S be a finite set with metric d and let P(S, d) denote the set of all 
probability measures on S. The Prohorov metric on P(S, d) is the function 
1r : P(S, d) x P(S, d) -> R defined so that 1r(P, Q) is the infimum of all f > 0 
such that 
AcS. 
(When P and Q have finite support the infimum is achieved.) 
(9.2) 
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Note that (9.2) holds for every£> 1r(P, Q) because if (9.2) holds for some 
£, then for any TJ > 0 
P(A) $ P(A11 ) $ Q((A11Y) + € $ Q(A'1+E) + €, 
and similarly with P and Q swapped, so (9.2) also holds with € replaced by 
€ + T/· Hence the set of€ for which (9.2) holds is the union of intervals of the 
form (e,oo) and hence has one of the forms(~, oo) or [c5, oo), only the latter being 
possible when P and Q have finite support. In either case 6 is the Prohorov 
distance between P and Q. 
In the following theorem and the rest of this chapter we restrict our attention 
to Nelson-style probability theory: all probability measures have finite support. 
Theorem 9 .1. 1r is a metric. 
Proof. The properties symmetry, nonnegativity, and 1r(P, P) = 0 are obvious. 
If P ;fa Q then p = dP ;fa q = dQ and there exists an x such that p(x) ;fa q(x). 
Define B = supp P U supp Q, where supp P denotes the support of P ( defined 
in Section 5.5). If B =f. { x}, then define 
«:1 = min{ d(x,y): y EB\ {x} }, 
otherwise (when B = { x}) define £1 = 1. Then £1 > 0 because B is a finite set, 
and for O < £ < € 1 we have 
P( {x }E) = p(x) and 
hence 1r(P, Q) ~ lp(x) - q(x)J. The triangle inequality follows from 
hence 
P(A) ~ Q(Af) + £, 
Q(N) ~ R(AE+'1) + TJ, 
€ > 1r(P,Q) 
TJ > 1r(Q,R) 
P(A) ~ R(AE+'1) + € + TJ, € + T/ > 1r(P, Q) + 1r(Q, R) 
and similarly with P and R swapped. D 
Another useful fact about the Prohorov metric is the following ( copied es-
sentially verbatim from Billingsley (1999, p. 72), because the argument uses no 
measure theory so Kolmogorov-style and Nelson-style argument is the same). 
Lemma 9.2. The Prohorov distance between P and Q is the infimum over all 
£ such that 
AcS. (9.3) 
Proof. First note that A c S \ BE if and only if B c S \ AE because either is 
the same as (\:/x E A)('v'y E B)(d(x,y) ~ e). If (9.3) holds, let B = S\AE, and 
then 
P(AE) = 1 - P(B) ~ 1 - Q(BE) - € = Q(S \ BE) - e ~ Q(A) - £ 
so (9.3) also holds with P and Q swapped, and hence (9.2} holds. 0 
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9.4 Near Equivalence and the Prohorov Metric 
Let ( S, d} and ( S', d'} be metric spaces. A function h : S --4 S' is nearly 
Lipschitz continuous if there exists a limited number L such that 
d'(h(x},h(y)) ~ L · d(x,y), x,yE S. 
Note that, the product of limited and infinitesimal numbers being infinitesi-
mal, a (nearly) Lipschitz continuous function is, as the name suggests, (nearly) 
continuous. 
Lemma 9.3. Let (S,d} be a metric space. For any nonempty ACS and any 
f » 0, define h : S --4 JR by 
h(x) = max(O, 1-d(x,A)/f). 
Then h is limited and nearly Lipschitz continuous. 
Proof. We first establish 
lh(x) - h(y)I ~ ld(x, A) - d(y, A)I _ 
€ 
(Case I) Suppose d(x, A) = 0 so h(x) = I. Then 
h(x}- h(y) = 1- h(y) = { ~(y,A)/< :i::~! ~: 
and in either case (9.4) holds. 
(Case II) Suppose d(x, A) ~ € so h(x) = 0. Then 
{
O, d(y, A) ~ f 
h(y) - h(x) = h(y) = 1 - d(y,A)/E, d(y,A) < f 
and in either case (9.4) holds. 
(9.4} 
(Case III) Suppose O < d(x,A) < £ so O < h(x) < 1 and similarly with y 
replacing x. Then 
h(y) _ h(x) = d(y, A) - d(x, A) 
f 
and again (9.4) holds. This finishes the proof of (9.4) (the other cases being like 
I and II with x and y swapped). 
Now for any z EA we have 
d(x, y) + d(y, z) ~ d(x, z) ~ d(x, A) 
taking the infimum over all z E A gives 
d(x,y) +d(y,A) ~ d(x,A} 
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and similarly with x and y swapped. Hence 
d(x,y) ~ ld(y,A)- d(x,A)I 
from which we see that (9.4) implies 
lh(x) - h(y)I ~ ld(x, A) - d(y, A)I ~ ! . d(x, y). 
€ € 
And, 1 / e being limited, this establishes the lemma ( and incidentally shows that 
the "Lipschitz constant" can be taken to be L = l / f). D 
Theorem 9.4. Assume P and Q are measures on (S, d) having finite support 
and that Ph~ Qh holds for every limited nearly Lipschitz continuous function 
h: s ~ JR. Then 1r(P,Q) ~ 0. 
Proof. For any nonempty A C S and any e » 0, define h : S ~ IR as in the 
lemma. Then his limited and nearly Lipschitz continuous. So Ph~ Qh. But 
and similarly with P replaced by Q. Hence P(A) ~ Ph~ Qh ~ Q(Ai) holds for 
all A. Thus (9.3) holds for every e » 0 and hence 1r(P, Q) is infinitesimal. D 
Theorem 9.5. Assume P and Q are measures on (S, d) having finite support 
and 1r(P, Q) ~ 0. Then P ~ Q. 
Proof. It is enough to prove Ph ~ Q h for all nearly continuous h satisfying 
0 < h < 1 because for any limited nearly continuous function g there exist 
limited a and b such that g =a+ bh and O < h < 1, in which case Ph~ Qh 
implies Pg~ Qg. 
But for such h we have by Lemma 5.2 the representation 
Ph= Z:P{h > t}dt 
tET 
where Tis a finite subset of (0, 1) containing O; 1, and h(suppP) and where 
the notation {h > t} denotes the event h(X) > t and P{h > t} denotes the 
probability of this event, where X is a random element such that P = .C(X). 
Note that t ~ 1 - P{h > t} is the distribution function of h(X). 
For arbitrary t in (0, 1) define At = {h > t}. Fix an infinitesimal e greater 
than 1r(P, Q). Then for x EA: we have h(x) ~ t and hence h(x) > t- o for any 
o » 0. Hence At c A~ c {h > t - o}. Thus we have 
P(At) = P{h > t} ~ P(AD ~ P{h > t-o} 
P(At) ;S Q(AD 
Q(At) ;S P(AD 
Q(At) = Q{h > t} ~ Q(A:) ~ Q{h > t- o} 
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from which we infer 
P{h > t} ;s Q{h > t - o} and Q{h > t} ;s P{h > t - o} (9.5a) 
holds for all t in (0, 1) and all o » 0. To simplify notation, we define U(t) = 
P{h > t} and V(t) = Q{h > t} so (9.5a) becomes 
U(s) 2: V(t) and V(s) 2: U(t), whenever s « t. (9.5b) 
We also define U+(t) = P{h ~ t} and V+(t) = Q{h ~ t}. 
Now for any limited n choose Si such that so = 0, Sn = 1, and 
i=l, ... ,n-1. 
It may be that some of the Si are equal, so we remove duplicates. Let 
maintaining So < si < · · · < S~n · 
Now for any o » 0 we have 
V(s; - o) 2: U(s: - o/2) ~ U+(s:) > U(s;) 2: V(st + o) (9.6) 
hence 
V(s; - o) + o ~ U+(s;) > U(s;) ~ V(s; + o) - o (9.7) 
holds for all o » 0 and hence by overspill (9.7) must hold for some infinitesimal 
o. For this infinitesimal o, define Ti = s;- - o and ti = st + o for i = 1, ... , 
ffln - 1, and also define To= to= 0 and Tmn = tmn = 1. 
Now 
mn 
Ph 2: I)s; - s;_ 1)U+(s;) (9.8a) 
i=l 
and 
mn 
Qh ;s I)ri - ti-1)V(ti-1) (9.8b) 
i=l 
because the contributions from the infinitesimal intervals (ti, ri) are negligible. 
For some integer k 
· * n-k+l V(ti-t) $ U(si-1) ~ ---
n 
n-k 
-n- < U+(s;) 
Combining these gives 
(9.8c) 
And combining (9.8c) with (9.8a) and (9.8b) and using the fact that s;-s;_ 1 ~ 
Ti - ti-I for all i gives Qh $ Ph+ 1/n. The same argument with P and Q 
swapped gives Ph ;s Qh + l/n. Since these hold for any limited n, we must 
have Ph !:='. Qh. D 
9.5. THE PORTMANTEAU THEOREM 
9.5 The Portmanteau Theorem 
Let ( S, d) be a metric space. Define for A c S 
The set Ae: is called the €-erosion of A. 
63 
Theorem 9.6. Let P and Q be measures on (S, d) having finite support and 11" 
the Prohorov metric. The following are equivalent 
(i) P and Q are nearly equivalent. 
(ii) Ph:::'. Qh for every limited Lipschitz continuous function h: S---+ JR. 
(iii) 1r(P, Q) is infinitesimal. 
(iv) For some€:::'. 0 and for all ACS we have P(A) ;S Q(Ae:). 
(.v) For every f » 0 and for all ACS we have P(A) ;S Q(N). 
(vi) For some f ~ 0 and for all A C S we have P(A) ~ Q(Ae:). 
(vii) For every f » 0 and for all AC S we have P(A) ~ Q(Ae:)-
Proof. The implication (i) ---+ (ii) is trivial. The implication (ii) ---+ (iii) is 
Theorem 9.4. The implication (iii) ---+ (i) is Theorem 9.5. 
By Lemma 9.2 (iii) is equivalent to the existence of an€:::'. 0 such that (9.3) 
holds, which implies (iv). The implication (iv) ---+ (v) is trivial. If (v) holds, 
then {9.3) holds for every € » 0, and hence by Lemma 9.2 {iii) holds. At this 
point we have established the equivalence of (i) through (v). 
The implications (iv) +-----+ (vi) and (v) +-----+ (vii) are just the complement 
rule: write B = S \ A so 
P(A) = 1 - P(B) and Q(N) = I - Q(Bt:) 
and 
P(A) ;S Q(AE) +-----+ P(B) ~ Q(BE) 
hence if the left hand side holds for all A, then the right hand side holds for all 
B and vice versa. D 
Let S and T be two different sets with S C T and d a metric for T and 
hence also for S. Pedantically, the restriction d,. of d to S x S is a metric for 
S and defines (S, dr) as a metric subspace of (T, d). Then elements P and Q of 
'P(S, dr) are nearly equivalent if and only if they are nearly equivalent considered 
as elements of P(T, d). The enclosing superspace T is irrelevant. This is clear 
from (iv) of the portmanteau theorem. Since P(A) = P(A n suppP), we need 
only check AC supp Pin establishing (iv). So long as we are only interested in 
two measures P and Q, we can tak~ S = supp P U supp Q, if we like, but any 
enclosing metric space does as well. 
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9.6 Continuous Mapping 
Let A be any property that may or may not hold at points of S and let P be 
a measure on ( S, d) having finite support. We say A holds P-almost everywhere 
if for every e » 0 there exists a set N such that P(N) ::; e and A(x) holds 
except for x in N. 
The following lemma is Theorem 17.3 in Nelson (1987). We reprove it here 
only to see how much shorter the proof gets with our extra apparatus. 
Lemma 9.7. Let P and Q be elements of P(S,d) such that P ~ Q, and let 
A be any property {internal or external) such that x, y E S and x ~ y implies 
A(x) ~ A(y). Then A holds P-almost everywhere if and only if it holds 
Q-almost everywhere. 
Proof. Suppose A holds P-almost everywhere. Fix e » O and choose N c S 
such that P(N) ::; e/2 and A(x) holds for all x E S \ N. By (vi) of the 
portmanteau theorem there is a o ~ 0 such that P(N) ~ Q(N6). So Q(N6) ::; e. 
By definition S\N6 = (S\N)6. Hence y E S\N6 if and only if there exists an x 
in S\N such that d(x,y) < o. This implies x ~ y, and hence A(y) holds. Hence 
A holds on S \ N6. Since e » 0 was arbitrary, A holds Q-almost everywhere. D 
Let P be a measure on (S, d) having finite support. A function h: S-+ S' is 
nearly continuous P-almost everywhere if the property A(x) in the definition of 
"almost everywhere" is "his nearly continuous at x." Note that by the lemma, 
when P ~ Q we have h nearly continuous P-almost everywhere if and only if h 
is nearly continuous Q-almost everywhere. 
For an arbitrary map h : S -+ S' and any measure P on (S, d), the image 
measure P' E (S', d') denoted by Po h- 1 is defined by 
P'(B) = P(h- 1(B)), Be S'. 
If a random element X has the distribution P, then the random element h(X) 
has the distribution Po h-1 • 
Theorem 9.8 (Continuous Mapping). Let (S, d) and (S', d') metric spaces, and 
let P, Q E P( S, d). Suppose P ~ Q, and suppose h : S -+ S' is nearly continuous 
P-almost everywhere. Then Po h- 1 ~ Q o h-1 • 
Proof. Fix e » 0 and choose N C S such that Q(N) ::; e/2 and h is nearly 
continuous on S\N. Let B' be an arbitrary subset of S', and write B = h- 1 (B'). 
Also define P' =Po h- 1 and Q' = Q o h-_1• 
Then P(B) = P'(B'). By (iii) of the portmanteau theorem there exists a 
o ~ O such that P(B) ;5 Q(B0). By near continuity, h maps B 0 \ N into B'£, 
which implies Q(B0 \ N) ::; Q'(B'£). Hence 
P'(B') = P(B) ;5 Q(B6 \ N) + Q(N) ::; Q'(B'£) + i 
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Reading from end to end we have 
P'(B') ~ Q'(B'E) + f 
and since e ~ 0 and B' C S' were arbitrary, this implies by Lemma 9.2 that 
the Prohorov distance between P' and Q' is infinitesimal. D 
Corollary 9.9. Let (S, d) and (S', d') metric spaces, and let X and Y be random 
elements of ( S, d) such that X ~ Y, and suppose h : S --+ S' is nearly continuous 
P-almost everywhere, where P = .C(X). Then h(X) ~ h(Y). 
9.7 Product Spaces 
Let (Si, d1 ) and (S2, d2) be metric spaces, then we make S1 x S2 into a 
metric space by giving it the metric d* defined by 
d* ( (x1, x2), (Y1, Y2)) = d' ( d1 (x1, Yt ), d2(x2, Y2)) 
where d' is any metric on R2 that is equivalent to one inducing the standard 
topology, for example, we may use any of 
d'(u, v) = lul + lvl 
d'(u, v) = Ju2 + v2 
d'(u, v) = max(lul, lvl) 
(9.9a) 
(9.9b) 
(9.9c) 
which are referred to as the L1, L 2 and L00 norms, respectively. We know from 
the comment at the end of Section 9.5 that it does not matter which d' we use, 
since they all give the same notion of near equivalence in P(S1 x S2 , d*). 
For our purposes here (9.9c) is the most useful, because of its special property 
that 
(9.10) 
making e-dilations particularly easy to work with. 
Let Pi: S1 x S2--+ Si denote the coordinate projection (x1,x2) 1-> Xi· Then 
for any PE P(S1 x S2, d*) the marginals of Pare the distributions Po p-; 1 . 
Theorem 9.10 (Slutsky). Suppose P, Q E P(S1 x S2, d*) and suppose 
i = 1,2 (9.11) 
and suppose supp( Q o p21 ) is a singleton. Then P ~ Q. 
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that (9.9c) is used to define d* so 
(9.10) holds. Write Pop; 1 =~and Qop;1 = Qi, and write {c} =suppQ2 • 
Choose an infinitesimal e: greater than either of the Prohorov distances between 
opposite sides of (9.11). For BC S 1 x S2 define 
B1 = {x1 E S1: (x1,c) EB}. 
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Then Q(B) = Q(B1 x {c}) = Qi(Bi)-
Also, Q2 ( { c}) = 1 implies P2( { c Y) '.:::'. 1 by the portmanteau theorem and 
Moreover, B :::::> Bi x {c} implies 
Bf.:::::> (B1 x {c}Y = Bj x {c}\ 
hence 
P(Bf.) ~ P(Bj x { c}f.) 
= Pi(Bi) - P(Bj x (S2 \ {c}f.)) 
~ P1(Bi) 
(9.12) 
the second term on the middle line being infinitesimal because of (9.12). Hence 
we have 
Q(B) = Q1(B1) ;S P1(Bi) ;S P(Bf.), 
the middle relation being an application of Lemma 9.2 and the other relations 
having already been established. Since B was arbitrary, we have (iv) of the 
portmanteau theorem. D 
Corollary 9.11. Suppose X = (X1,X2) andY = (Yi, Y2) are random elements 
of (S1 x S2, d*) and Y2 is a constant random element, and suppose 
then 
Chapter 10 
Distribution Functions 
10.1 The Levy Metric 
The Lev1J metric on the set of all distribution functions (with finite support) 
on JR is the function A defined so that A(F, G) is the infimum of all € > 0 such 
that 
F(x) :::; G(x +€)+€and G(x) :::; F(x + €) + f, XE JR. (10.1} 
It is easy to see that A actually is a metric. 
Actually, the Levy metric can be applied to any nondecreasing functions 
R --+ JR. We shall do this in Corollary 10.6 below, where we consider Levy 
distance between the distribution function of a Nelson-style random variable 
and the distribution function <I> of the normal distribution in Kolmogorov-style 
probability theory. 
We say nondecreasing functions F and G are nearly equal, written F ~ G, 
if A(F, G) ~ 0. Caution: this does not necessarily imply that random variables 
having distribution functions F and G are nearly equivalent! See Theorem 10.4 
below. 
Lemma 10.1. Suppose F and G are nondecreasing functions and G is nearly 
continuous, Then F '.::::'. G if and only if F(x) ~ G(x}, for all x E JR. 
Proof. One direction is trivial. Conversely, suppose A(F, G) = e ~ 0. Then by 
near continuity of G 
G(x) ~ G(x - €) - E ~ F(x) ~ G(x + E) + e ~ G(x) 
holds for all x. D 
Lemma 10.2. If A is the Levy metric and 1r the Prohorov metric, F and Gare 
distribution functions and P and Q are the corresponding measures, then 
1r(P, Q) ~ A(F, G). 
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Proof Fix€> 1r(P,Q). Then 
F(x) = P{(-oo,xJ} 
:5 Q{(-oo,xn + € 
= Q{(-oo,x + €)} + € 
= max G(y + E) + f 
y<x 
holds for all x. In particular we have 
(10.2) 
whenever x + f is not a jump of G. However, even if x + f is a jump of G, there 
exists a o > 0 sufficiently small so that G has no jump in (x + €, x + € + o], and, 
applying (10.2) with f replaced by f + o, we have 
F(x) :5 G(x + E + o) + E + o = G(x + E) + E + o, 
which, since o > 0 was arbitrary, implies {10.2) even when x +€is a jump of G. 
The same argument with F and G swapped finishes the proof. D 
10.2 Near Equivalence 
Corollary 10.3. If X and Y are rondom variables having distribution functions 
F and G, then X ~ Y implies F ~ G. 
Theorem 10.4. If X and Y are random variables having distribution functions 
F and G, either X or Y is limited almost surely, and F ~ G, then X ~ Y. 
The limited almost surely condition cannot be suppressed. Let X have the 
uniform distribution on the even integers between 1 and 2v and Y have the 
uniform distribution on the odd integers between 1 and 2v. Then if F and G 
are the corresponding distribution functions, then we have 
1 0 :5 G(x) - F(x) :5 -
V 
for all x. So A(F, G) is infinitesimal whenever vis unlimited. But, if his defined 
by h(x) = sin2 (1rx), then his a limited continuous function, and h(X) = 0 and 
h(Y) = 1 (for all w). 
Proof Fix arbitrary appreciable Et and f2. By Lemma 9. 7, if one of X and Y is 
limited almost surely and X ~ Y, then the other is also limited almost surely. 
Hence, by Lemma 6.3, there exist limited a and b such that 
F(a) :5 Et 
F(b) ~ 1 - Et 
(10.3a) 
(10.3b) 
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and similarly with F replaced by G. Leth be a nearly continuous function with 
limited bound M. Then 
and 
IE{h(X)Jc-oo,a](X)}I s MF(a) s Af €1 
IE{h(X)Icb,oo)(X)}I S M[l - F(b)] S M€1 
and similarly with X replaced by Y and F replaced by G. 
{10.4a) 
{10.4b) 
By near continuity of h there exists 8 » 0 such that lh(x) - h(y)I s €2 
whenever Ix - YI s fi. There exists a limited natural number n such that 
(b - a)/n s fi/2. Define Ck= a+ (k/n)(b- a) for integer k, noting that Co= a 
and Cn = b. Then 
{10.5) 
and this together with (10.4a) and (10.4b) implies 
IE{h(X)} -~ h(ck)[F(ck) - F(ck-1)) I $ <2 + 2M e1. (10.6) 
The assumption .\(F, G) ~ 0 implies that there exist bk and dk such that 
bk S Ck s dk and bk ~ Ck ~ dk and 
for all k. 
The same reasoning that lead to (10.6) implies that (10.6) holds with X replaced 
by Y and F replaced by G. But 
n+l n+l L h(ck) [F(ck) - F(ck-t)] - L h(ck) [G(bk) - G(bk-1)] 
k=l k=l 
n 
= 1:[h(ck) - h(ck+i)] · [F(ck) - G(bk)] 
k=l 
+ h(Cn+1) [F(cn+1) - G(bn+1)] - h(c1) [F(eo) - G(bo)] (10.7) 
and O ;S F(ck) - G(bk) ;S G(dk) - G(bk), and the latter sum to less or equal to 
one. Hence, a limited sum of infinitesimals being infinitesimal (Corollary 3.5), 
the sum in (10.7) is weakly less than €2 and weakly greater than zero. The other 
terms are less than or equal to 4M €1 in absolute value. That is, 
n+l n+l L h(ck) [F(ck) - F(ck-1)] - L h(ck) [G(bk) - G(bk-1)] s e2 + 4Me1, 
k=l k=l 
Hence by the triangle inequality 
IE{h(X)} - E{h(Y)}I s 3€3 + 8Me1. 
Since f1 and €2 were arbitrary appreciable numbers and M is limited, we actually 
have E{h(X)} ~ E{h(Y)}. D 
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10.3 General Normal Distributions 
Standard normal random variables were defined in Section 8.1. They are the 
distributions that arise as limits in the central limit theorem (Corollary 8.1). 
We found out more about these distributions in Theorem 8.2 and Corollary 8.3. 
Here we finish the job. 
Lemma 10.5. A standard normal random variable is limited almost surely. 
Proof. It is established near the end of the proof of Theorem 8.2 that the random 
variable Z defined in the theorem statement, which is standard normal, is limited 
almost surely. Hence by Lemma 9. 7 every standard normal random variable is 
limited almost surely. D 
Corollary 10.6. A random variable is standard normal if and only if its dis-
tribution function is nearly equal to <l> defined by 
<P(x) = - e-t 12 dt. 1 1:r 2 
../2-rr -oo {10.8) 
Proof. Theorem 8.2 and Corollary 8.3 assert that one particular standard nor-
mal random variable has distribution function nearly equal to <P. Hence by 
Corollary 10.3, Theorem 10.4, and Lemma 10.5 a random variable is standard 
normal if and only if its distribution function is nearly equal to <P. 0 
Note that <P is nearly continuous by Lemma 4.1, so by Lemma 10.1 and 
the preceding lemma a random variable is standard normal if and only if its 
distribution function F satisfies 
F(x) ~ <P(x), xER. 
If Z is a standard normal random variable, µ is a limited real number, and 
u is a positive appreciable real number, then we say X = µ + u Z is general 
normal and we also apply this terminology to the distribution of X. Like 
standard normality, general normality is an external property. 
Analogies with Kolmogorov-style probability theory tempt us to call µ the 
mean and u the standard deviation, but in Nelson-style probability theory, this 
is nonsense. A normal distribution, as we have defined the concept, need not 
have moments anywhere near those of a conventional normal distribution. 
Theorem 10. 7. If Z is an L 2 standard normal random variable and X = 
µ + uZ, whereµ and u are limited and u ~ 0, then X is L2 , E(X) ~ µ, and 
var(X) ~ u2 • 
Proof. Every standard normal random variable that arises in the central limit 
theorem (Corollary 8.1) is L2 • Moreover, such a random variable {8.1) has 
mean zero and standard deviation one by standardization. Since the map x 1-+ 
x<a) defined by (6.6} is limited and continuous for limited a, it follows by the 
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approximation lemma (Lemma 6. 7) that nearly equivalent £2 random variables 
have nearly equal mean and variance. Hence E( Z) ~ 0 and var( Z) ~ 1. 
By (6.4a) and (6.4b), Xis L 2• It is elementary that E(X) = µ+oB(Z) and 
var(X) = u2 var(Z). The assertion about E(X) and var(X) then follows from 
Theorems 3.7 and 3.10. D 
Hence if we were to take £ 2 as part of the definition of "normal" then µ 
and u would be nearly equal to the mean and standard deviation. We have 
decided to not take £2 as part of the definition, because it is easier to add it 
when wanted (say "L2 and normal") than to remove it when not wanted (say 
"nearly equivalent to a normal random variable"). 
Theorem 10.8. If Z is a standard normal random variable and X = µ + uZ, 
whereµ and u are limited and u 2:: 0, then the median of the distribution of X 
is nearly equal toµ and the <I>(l) quantile of X is nearly equal toµ+ u, where 
<I> is defined by (10.8). 
Proof. Writing </> = <I>', we have for a < b 
<I>(b) - <I>(a) 2:: (b - a)</> (max(lal, lbl)) 
by the law of the mean and the unimodality of</>. From </>(z) = exp(-z2 /2)/../2-rr 
and Theorems 3.10 and 3.11 we conclude 
<I>(a) « <I>(b), whenever -oo «a« b « oo. (10.9) 
Since Z is limited almost surely, its p-th quantiles for O « p « 1 are limited 
and (10.9) implies these quantiles are unique up to near equality. In particular, 
the 0.5 and <I>(l) ~ 0.8413 quantiles are unique up to near equality, and nearly 
equal to zero and one, respectively. Then Theorem 3.10 implies the 0.5 and <I>(l} 
quantiles of the distribution of X are nearly equal toµ andµ+ u, respectively. 
0 
Chapter 11 
Characteristic Functions 
11.1 Definitions 
As always, JR denotes the real number system. Now we introduce CC for the 
complex number system. 
The characteristic function of a random variable X is a function <p : R -+ C 
defined by 
t E Jlt 
Complex variables play only a limited, algebraic role in the theory. By the 
Euler formula 
eiy = cos(y) + i sin(y) 
characteristic functions are determined by two real-valued functions, which are 
ti-+ E{cos(tX)}, the real part of <p, and ti-+ E{sin(tX)}, the imaginary part of 
<p. The only virtue in using complex numbers is that certain identities, such as 
are "obvious" phrased in terms of complex exponentials and not "obvious" when 
phrased in terms of trigonometric identities. 
For x and y in JRd we denote the standard inner product by ( · , · ) , that is, 
d 
(x,y} = SxiYi, 
i=l 
where x = (x1, .. . , xd) and similarly with x replaced by y. 
The characteristic function of a random vector X taking values in JRd is a 
complex-valued function <p defined on all of ]Rd by 
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If d is limited, we say Rd is limited-dimensional. When Rd is limited-
dimensional, an element of Rd is 
• infinitesimal if and only if all its components are infinitesimal 
• and limited if and only if all its components are limited. 
As usual, unlimited means not limited, and appreciable means limited and non-
infinitesimal. 
Clearly, a limited-dimensional random vector is infinitesimal, appreciable, or 
unlimited if and only if its L00 norm is, where this norm is defined by 
llxlloo = max{ lxil: i = l, ... ,d}. 
As usual, we write x ~ y to mean x - y ~ 0. If we define the LP norms by 
for I ::; p < oo, then the obvious inequality 
implies that a limited-dimensional random vector is infinitesimal, appreciable, 
or unlimited if and only if its LP norm is likewise. 
When d is unlimited, the LP norms no longer agree about which vectors are 
infinitesimal, appreciable, and unlimited. Hence our original definition based 
on the behavior of components no longer makes sense either. Thus we shall 
see that the characteristic function theory we develop here is useful only for 
limited-dimensional random vectors. 
11.2 Convergence I 
A famous and very important theorem of Kolmogorov-style probability the-
ory says that a sequence of random variables converges in distribution if and 
only if the characteristic functions converge pointwise. In this section we start 
to develop the Nelson-style analog, working on the easy airection of the "if and 
only ir7 (the other direction is dealt with in Section 11.6). 
Theorem 11.1. If two limited-dimensional random vectors are nearly equiva-
lent, then their characteristic .functions are nearly equal at all limited argument 
values. · 
Proof. For limited t, the function x 14 ei(t,x) is limited and (nearly) continuous 
because of 
ei(t,x) _ ei{t,y) = ei(t,x) {I_ ei(t,y-x)), 
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which implies 
lei(t,x} - ei(t,y) I ~ 11 - ei(t,y-x) I 
= Vil - cos((t, y - x}) 12 +lsin( (t, y - x}) 12 , 
because (t, y - x} ~ 0 whenever x ~ y by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and 
because sine and cosine are nearly continuous at zero ( and everywhere else) by 
Lemma 4.1. D 
We cannot ask for near equality at all t. Consider the random variable 
concentrated at zero, which has characteristic function identically equal to one, 
and another random variable concentrated at a nonzero infinitesimal f, which 
has characteristic function t 1--+ eitt:. These two random variables are nearly 
equivalent, but eite is not nearly equal to one for all t. 
11.3 The Discrete Fourier Transform 
Let 
T = { kf : k E Z, lkl ~ n} {11.1) 
where f > 0, Z is the set of all integers, and n is a positive integer. We call such 
a set Ta symmetric grid; we call€ the spacing of T and write f = spac{T}; we 
call N = 2n + 1 the cardinality of T and write N = card(T). 
If T is defined as in ( 11.1) then we define 
T* = { kf* : k E Z, lkl ~ n} {11.2} 
where 
* 271' 
f =-Nf (11.3} 
and call T* the symmetric grid conjugate to T. Of course spac(T*) = €* and 
card{T*) = N. 
If f : T ---+ CC is any function, then 
f*(t) = € L J(x)eitx {11.4) 
xe_T 
defines a function T* ---+ CC that we call the discrete Fourier trans/ orm of J. The 
terminology "discrete Fourier transform" is also used for the mapping (CT -. cT· 
given by f 1--+ J*. 
Theorem 11.2. The discrete Fourier transform f 1--+ f* is invertible with in-
verse f* 1--+ f given by 
f(x) = .::_ """""f*(t)e-itx_ 
271" ~ 
teT• 
(11.5) 
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Proof. Plugging (11.4) into the right hand side of (11.5) we obtain 
\;* L L f(y)eitye-itx = ~ L L f(y)eit(y-x) 
teT· yET teT· yET 
We now claim that 
= L f (y) ! L eit(y-x) 
yET teT• 
! L eit(y-x) 
teT• 
(11.6) 
is zero if y =fix and one if y = x, which implies (11.5). To establish this claim, 
suppose y - x = kE, so k is an integer and lkl ~ 2n. Then 
n t L eit(y-x) = ! L eit:*mt:k 
teT• m=-n 
n 
= ~ L e21fimk/N 
m=-n 
2n 
= e-21fink/N ~ L e21fimk/N 
m=O 
Now we have two cases. If k = 0, which happens if and only if x = y, then 
the exponentials are all equal to one and this reduces to (1/N) E!:1=o 1 = 1. 
Otherwise, k =fi 0, and, recall, lkl ~ 2n < N. Define w = exp(21rik/N). Then 
0 < lkl < N implies w =fi l, and 
2n 2n L e21fimk/N = L Wm 
m=O m=O 
1-WN 
= 1-w 
Now wN = 1, so that finishes the proof of the claim that (11.6) is zero if y =fix 
and one otherwise. D 
If f : Td --. C is any function, then 
f*(t) = Ed L f(x)ei(t,x) (11.7) 
xeTd 
defines a function (T* )d --. C that we call the multivariate discrete Fourier 
trans/ orm of f. This terminology is also used for the mapping f ~ f*. 
Theorem 11.3. The multivariate discrete Fourier transform f ~ f* is invert-
ible urith inverse J* ~ f given by 
/(x) = G: r L f*(t)e-i(t,z)_ (11.8) 
tE(T•)d 
11.4. THE DOUBLE EXPONENTIAL DISTRIBUTION 77 
Proof. Plugging (11. 7) into the right hand side of (11.8) we obtain 
d . ( \;*) L L /(y)ei(t,y)e-i(t,x) = ~d L L /(y)ei(t,y-z) 
tE(T•)d yETd tE(T•)d yETct 
= L f (y) ~d L ei{t,y-x} 
yETd tE(T•)d 
d 
= L f (y) TI t L eitk(Yk-xk) 
yETd k=l tkET• 
where t = (t1 , •.. , tk) and similarly for x and y. Now we know from the proof of 
Theorem 11.2 that the innermost average is zero unless Yk = Xk, in which case 
it is one. Thus the product is zero unless y = x, in which case it is one. Thus 
the only nonzero term in the outermost sum is when y = x, in which case it is 
f(x). D 
Notice that if we have a random variable concentrated on T whose proba-
bility function is given by 
Pr(X = x) = Ej(x), xET, 
then the restriction of the characteristic function to T* is the discrete Fourier 
transform f*. Similarly, if we have a random vector concentrated on Td whose 
probability function is given by 
Pr(X = x) = ed f(x), 
then the restriction of the characteristic function to (T*)d is the discrete Fourier 
transform f*. 
11.4 The Double Exponential Distribution 
Let T be a symmetric grid that is also a near line, so spac(T) is infinitesimal 
and max(T) is unlimited. Let a > 0 be a real parameter. Then we call the 
distribution concentrated on T having unnormalized density 
XE T, 
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double exponential with rate parameter o. The normalizing constant for this 
distribution is calculated as follows 
c(o) = € L e-o:lxl 
xET 
n 
= € L e-ae1k1 
k=-n 
= € (2 t e-aek - 1) 
k=O 
=€ 2·------1 ( 
1 - e-o:E(n+I) ) 
1 - e-ae 
1 - 2e-oe(n+l) + e-o:e 
= €. --------1 - e-QE 
1-2An+I +A 
= e. --1---A--
{11.9) 
where we have introduced A = e-ae, and the normalized density is given by 
.f ( ) = h0 (x) 
Jo: x c(a) ' xET. 
Lemma 11.4. A double exponential distribution with unlimited rote pamme-
ter is infinitesimal almost surely. A double exponential distribution with non-
infinitesimal rate parameter is limited almost surely. 
Proof. Suppose X has the double exponential distribution with rate parameter 
a. Then for O < m < n. 
2 n 
Pr(IXI ~me)= _f L e-o:Ek 
c(o) k=m 
2€ n-m 
= -- . e-oem L e-oEk 
c(o) k=O 
2€ 1 _ e-OE(n-m+l) 
= __ -e-oem 
c(o) 1 - e-ae 
2€ Am{l -An-m+I) 
= c(o) · 1-A 
2Am(l - An-m+I) 
= 1-2An+1 +A 
If me ~ O and a is unlimited, then by the rules of exponentiation (Sec-
tion 3.3) A ~ 1 and Am '.:::'. An+l '.:::'. 0. Since O ~ An-m+l ~ 1, we have 
{11.10) 
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So the first statement follows from condition (ii) of Lemma 6.2. 
If me ~ oo and a » 0, then A ~ l and Am ~ An+l ~ 0 again follow 
from the rules of exponentiation, and we obtain (11.10) again. So the second 
statement follows from condition (ii) of Lemma 6.3. D 
The characteristic function of the double exponential distribution with rate 
parameter a is given by 
IPa(t) = _e_ L e-alxl+itx 
c(a) T 
xE 
n 
= _e_ L e-m,lkl+itek 
c(a) k=-n 
= _e_ (t e-<a-it)ek + t e-(a+it)ek _ 1) 
c(a) k=O k=O 
€ ( 1 _ e-(a-it)e(n+l) 1 _ e-(a+it)f{n+l) ) 
= - --~--,- + ----- - 1 c(a) 1 _ e-(a-it)e 1 _ e-(a+it)i 
Since a double exponential distribution is symmetric about zero, the char-
acteristic function is real, which is obvious from the fact that the two fractions 
in the large parentheses in the form above are complex conjugates of each other 
and hence their sum is real. 
Using eiw = cos(w) + i sin(w) and clearing complex quantities from the 
denominator by multiplying numerator and denominator by their complex con-
jugates gives (after much formula manipulation, which has been checked using 
a computer algebra system) 
e 1 - 2e-ae(n+l) cos[(n + l)et] + 2e-ae(n+2) cos(net) - e-2ae 
IPa(t) = c(a) · 1 - 2e-ae cos(et) + e-2ai 
e 1 - 2An+l cos[(n + l)et] + 2An+2 cos(net) - A 2 
=--· 
. c(a) 1 - 2Acos(et) + A 2 
1 
2An+I[1- cos((n + I)et)-A + Acos(net)] 
+ (1 - A)(l - 2An+1 + A) 
= ---------------------- (11.11) 
1 2A(l - cos(et)) + (1-A)2 
We need the following bounds for sine and cosine 
x3 
x - 31 ~ sin(x) ~ x, x~0 {11.12a) 
x2 x2 x4 
1--<cos(x)<l--+-2 - - 2 4!' x~0 (11.12b) 
These are easily proved in order of degree of the bound. The function fi(x) = 
x - sin(x) has derivative 1 - cos(x), which is nonnegative, hence Ji is non-
decreasing and greater than or equal to Ji (0) = 0 for x ~ 0. The function 
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h(x) = cos(x) - 1 + x2 /2 has derivative /i (x), which is nonnegative, hence h 
is nondecreasing and greater than or equal to h(O) = 0 for x ~ 0. The function 
h(x) = sin(x) - x + x 3 /3! has derivative h(x), which is nonnegative, hence h 
is nondecreasing and greater than or equal to /J(O) = 0 for x ~ 0. The function 
f 4 (x) = 1 - x2 /2 - x4/4! - cos(x) has derivative '3(x), which is nonnegative, 
hence /4 is 'nondecreasing and greater than or equal to / 4(0) = 0 for x ~ 0. 
Since both sides of each inequality in (11.12b) are symmetric functions of x, we 
actually have 
hence 
x2 x2 x4 
1 - - < cos(x) < 1 - - + -2 - - 2 4!' 
x2 
1 - cos(x) rv 2' x~o. 
xER 
For non-infinitesimal x we use the bounds, also from {11.13), 
x2 x2 ( ,r4) 1 - - < cos(x) < 1 - - 1 - -2 - - 2 12 ' 
(11.13) 
(11.14) 
(11.15) 
Lemma 11.5. Let cp0 denote the discrete Fourier transform of the double ex-
ponential density with appreciable rate parameter a defined on a symmetric grid 
T that is also a near line and satisfies 
Then 
and 
spac(T) · max(T) ~ oo. 
1 
'Po(t) ~ --t-2 , 
1 + o2 
2 
0 < 'Po(t) :5 t2 , 
1 + 6o2 
ltl « 00 
t ET*. 
(11.16) 
(11.17) 
(11.18) 
The near equality (11.17) is mildly interesting, in that we derive it without 
reference to the right hand side being the Kolmogorov-style characteristic func-
tion of the Kolmogorov-style (continuous) double exponential distribution with 
rate parameter a. Of course, it could also be derived from Corollary 4.8 and 
the Kolmogorov-style result. 
The bounds (11.18) will be crucial in our proof of the characteristic function 
convergence theorem in Section 11.6. 
The condition (11.16) is inelegant but harmless, because we only use this 
lemma as a technical tool and can always assure that the condition is satisfied. 
For example, if we want max(T) = M, then we can choose n = f M 3l 2l and 
f = spac(T) = M/n rv M- 112 • 
Proof. Recall that <p0 (t) is given by (11.11), and that A= e-o(. It follows from 
the rules of exponentiation {Section 3.3) that A~ 1 but An+l ~ 0. 
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We first show that the numerator of (11.11) is nearly equal to one fort ET*. 
From Jcos(x)I $ 1 and A~ 1 we have 11 - cos({n + l)Et)-A + Acos(nEt)I ;S 2, 
and from An+l ~ 0 we have 1 +A+ 2An+I ~ 2. 
Since 1 - exp(-m) ,...., OE by Lemma 4.9 and the following comments, and 
since exp(x) 2: 1 + x, for x ~ 0 by the Maclaurin series for the exponential 
function, we have for any appreciable positive T/ 
An exp(-nm) < 1 +TJ < -1 -2 -2 
1 
+ 
-- = ---- ---- n o e ( TJ). 1 -A 1 - exp(-m) - oe(l + nae) -
Hence (o being appreciable) condition (11.16) implies An /(1 -A)~ 0. Putting 
all this together we have the numerator of ( 11.11) n~arly equal to one. 
Using A ~ l and 1 - A ,...., m, which were derived above, and (11.14) we 
obtain 
2A[l - cos(et)] t2 
(1 - A)2 ,...., o 2 
and combining this with our result about the numerator of (11.11) we get 
(11.17), using Lemma 4.4 several times. 
Since we only consider t E T*, we have ltl $ ne*, hence jetl $ n€€* = 
21rn/N < 1r. Thus we can apply (11.15) to the term 1 - cos(et) in the denomi-
nator of (11.11), obtaining 
€2t2 ( 7r2) 
2 1 - 12 $ 1 - cos( et) 
We know from our earlier analysis that A/(1 - A)2 ,...., 1/(oe)2 • Hence for any 
positive o « 1 we have 
!:_ . 0 (l _ 1r2 ) < 2A[l - cos(et)] 
o 2 12 - {1 - A)2 ' 
and, since 1/6 « 1 - 1r2 /12, we can choose o so this becomes 
t2 2A(l - cos(et)] 
-<-~-~-. 6a2 - (1 -A)2 
Combining this with our result about the numerator of (11.11) gives one in-
equality in (11.18). The positivity assertion is obvious. D 
11.5 Convolution 
For x and y in T we define x EB y to be the sum "modulo T", that is, the 
unique element of T having the form x + y + kN E where N = card(T) and k 
is an integer. If ne = max(T) so N = 2n + 1 (notation we have been using all 
along), then, for example, nE EBE = -ne and ne + ne = -e. 
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For x and y in T and t in T* we have 
exp(i(x EB y)t) = exp(i{x + y + kN€)t) 
= exp(ixt) exp(iyt) exp(ikN £t) 
= exp{ixt) exp(iyt) exp(ikmN£€*) 
= exp(ixt) exp(iyt) exp(21rikm) 
= exp(ixt) exp(iyt) 
for some integers k and m. 
For any random variable Z concentrated on T let <pz denote the restriction 
of its characteristic function to T*. This conflicts with our earlier notation, 
which is still in force. If X is a random variable, then <px is its characteristic 
function. If a is a real number, then <p0 is the characteristic function of the 
double exponential distribution with rate parameter a. 
If X and Y are independent random variables concentrated on T, then 
'PXeY(t) = E{ eit(XEBY)} 
= E{ eitX eitY} 
= <px(t)cpy(t) 
Of course, except for EB rather than +, this fact is familiar from classical 
probability theory. So long as we are interested only in random variables that 
are limited almost surely and so long as Tis a near line, there is no practical 
difference between X + Y and X EB Y. The fact proved in this section will serve 
just as well as its classical counterpart. 
For vectors we define EB to act coordinatewise 
(x1, ... , xd) EB (Y1, ... , Yd) = (x1 EB yi, ... , Xd EB Yd) 
Then <pxey(t) = cpx(t)ipy(t) also holds where X and Y are random elements 
of Td and all three characteristic functions are restricted to (T* )d. 
11.6 Convergence II 
11.6.1 One-Dimensional 
We continue to let T be a symmetric grid that is also a near line and satisfies 
(11.16). For any random variable X concentrated on T, we denote its density 
by Ix, so 
Pr{X = x} = £/x(x). 
We also continue to let <p x denote the characteristic function of X. 
Lemma 11.6. Let X and Y be random variables and Z0 a double exponential 
random variable with appreciable rate parameter a independent of X and Y, all 
three random variables concentrated on T. Suppose 
<px(t) ~ cpy(t), t E T*, ltl « oo. 
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Then 
xET. {11.19) 
Proof. By (11.5) 
(11.20) 
and similarly with X replaced by Y. Since <px(t)e-itx is bounded in modulus 
by 1 and similarly with X replaced by Y and by the bound (11.18) on <p0 (t) 
the.sum (11.20) satisfies the conditions for Corollary 4.7 and similarly with X 
replaced by Y. Thus that corollary implies (11.19). D 
Lemma 11.7 (Scheffe). Let X and Y be almost surely limited random variables 
concentrated on the symmetric grid T that is also a near line, and suppose 
I x(x) := fy(x), xET. {11.21) 
Then 
e L lfx(x) - fy(x)I := 0 {11.22) 
:rET 
and for any limited function h on T 
E{h(X)} = e L h(x)fx(x) := € L h(x)fy(x) = E{h(Y)}. (11.23) 
xET xET 
As usual when we take an eponym from classical probability theory, this 
is not what is usually called Scheffe's lemma (Lehmann, 1959, p. 351) but the 
lemma that plays the same role in radically elementary probability theory. 
Note that the conclusion (11.21) is stronger than near equivalence of X and 
Y since it holds for all limited h, not just limited nearly continuous h. In 
Kolmogorov-style probability theory this type of convergence {what Scheffe's 
lemma implies) is called convergence in total variation. We shall not use it 
enough to need a name for it. 
Proof. By (iii) of Lemma 6.3 for any T/ » 0 we can choose a limited a such that 
Pr{IXI >a}= e L Jx(x) ~ i 
xET 
lxl>a 
and similarly with X replaced by Y. Hence 
~ 2,,, 
e ~ lfx(x) - fy(x)I ~ 3 , 
xeT 
lxl>a 
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and by Theorem 4.5 and (11.21) 
e L lfx(x) - fy(x)I ~ 0. 
xET 
lxl~a 
Hence by the triangle inequality 
" 217 e ~ If x(x) - fy(x)I :S 3 . 
xET 
Since 1J » 0 was arbitrary, this gives (11.22). And (11.22) immediately implies 
(11.23). D 
. Theorem 11 .8. Let X and Y be almost surely limited random variables, and 
suppose 
'PX (t) ~ <py(t), 
Then X and Y are nearly equivalent. 
for all limited t. (11.24) 
Proof Choose a symmetric grid T that is also a near line and satisfies (11.16) 
such that max(T) is larger than the maximum of the supports of IXI and !YI. 
Define g : lR -. T by g(x) = max{ t E T : t ~ x }. Then g(X) ~ X 
always, hence almost surely, hence g(X) is nearly equivalent to X by part (iii) 
of Theorem 7.3, and similarly with X replaced by Y. By Theorem 11.1 we have 
<px(t) ~ 'Pg(X) for limited t, and similarly with X replaced by Y, hence we 
have 'Pg(X) ~ 'Pg(Y) for limited t, because ~ is an external equivalence relation 
(Corollary 3.9). 
Let Zo. have the double exponential distribution on T with rate parameter 
a and be independent of X and Y. 
First suppose o is appreciable. It is clear that g(X) is limited almost surely. 
By Lemma 11.4 so is Z0 • Since x EB y = x + y whenever x and y are limited, 
and sum of limited is limited, it is clear that g(X) EB Z0 is also limited almost 
surely. Then by Lemma 11.6 and by Lemma 11.7 and the comment following 
it, g(X) EB Z 0 is nearly equivalent to g(Y) EB Z 0 • 
Second suppose a is unlimited. Then by Lemma 11.4 Zo. ~ 0 almost surely. 
Hence by Slutsky's theorem (Theorem 9.10) the random vector (g(X), Z0 ) is 
nearly equivalent to the random vector (g(X), 0), and similarly with X replaced 
by Y. The map (x, y) 1-+ x@y is continuous at points (x, y) such that x and y are 
limited. Hence by the continuous mapping theorem (Theorem 9.8), g(X) EB Z0 
is nearly equivalent to g(X) EBO = g(X), and similarly with X replaced by Y. 
Fix a limited nearly continuous function h : T ~ lR, and fix 1J » 0. Then 
jE{h(g(X)EBZ0 )}-E{h(g(X))}j $ i 
for all unlimited a and hence by overspill for some limited a, and similarly with 
X replaced by Y, and we may use the same limited a for both. Since 
E{ h(g(X) EB Z0 )} ~ E{ h(g(Y) EB Z0 ) }, 
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we have 
IE{h(g(X))} - E{h(g(Y))}I ;S 2; 
by the triangle inequality. Since T/ » 0 was arbitrary, 
E{ h(g(X))} ~ E{ h(g(Y))}. 
Since h was an arbitrary limited nearly continuous function, g(X) is nearly 
equivalent to g(Y). Since near equivalence is an external equivalence relation 
(Lemma 7.2), X ~ g(X) ~ g(Y) ~ Y implies X ~ Y. D 
11.6.2 Limited-Dimensional 
Th~orem 11.9. Let X and Y be almost surely limited random vectors, taking 
values in Rd for limited d, and suppose (11.24) holds. Then X and Y are nearly 
equivalent. 
Proof The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 11.8. We just need the mul-
tivariate analogs of each tool used in that proof. We already have the inversion 
theorem for the discrete Fourier transform (Theorem 11.3). 
The analog of the symmetric grid T in the proof of Theorem 11.8 is Td 
where T is a symmetric grid that is also a near line and satisfies (11.16) such 
that max(T) is larger than all values of IIXll00 and IIYlloo· As usual,€= spac(T) 
and f* = spac(T*). 
The analog of the function g in the proof of Theorem 11.8 is a map from Rd 
to Td that operates coordinatewise, the action on each coordinate being the g 
in the proof of Theorem 11.8. We again call this map g. Then again we have 
g(X) ~ X almost surely, hence g(X) and X are nearly equivalent, and similarly 
with X replaced by Y. 
For the analog of Z 0 in the proof of Theorem 11.8 we use here the random 
vector, also denoted Z0 having independent and identically distributed compo-
nents all of which have the double exponential distribution with rate parameter 
a. Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 11.4 imply Zais almost surely zero when a~ oo 
and limited almost surely when a» 0. 
The multivariate analog of Lemma 11.6 is proved much the same way, the 
only additional wrinkle being external induction on the dimension. Now by 
Theorem 11.3 we have 
( 
* )d d 
/g(X)$Za (x) = ;7r L IPg(X) (t) JI IPoc(tj )e-it;x; 
tE(T•)d 3=1 
€* f* 
= 21r L 1Pa(t1)e-itix1 21r L 'Pa(t2)e-it2:z:2 
t1ET• t2ET· 
... ;: L C,Oa(td)e-itdxdcpg(X)(t) 
tdET• 
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where x and t denote vectors with components Xi and ti and where the sum in 
the first line over (T* )d is replaced by d iterated sums over T* in the next two 
lines, and similarly with X replaced by Y. Hence 
/g(X)(f)Z0 (x) - /g(Y)(f)Z0 (x) = ;: L 'Po-(t1)e-itixi ~: L cp0 (t2)e-it2 x2 
t1ET• t2eT• 
· · · ;: L 'Pa(td)e-itdxdl'Pg(X)(t) - 'Pg(Y)(t)I 
tdeT• 
Now by assumption <p x ( t) ~ cpy ( t) for limited t, and by Theorem 11.1 we have 
cpx(t) ~ 'Pg(X) for limited t and similarly with X replaced by Y. Thus the 
term in the absolute value above is infinitesimal for limited t. Corollary 4.7 now 
shows that the bottom line above is infinitesimal when a: is appreciable. Then 
external induction shows that /g(X)$Za (x)- /g(Y)(f)Za (x) is infinitesimal (for all 
XE T). 
The multivariate analog of Lemma 11. 7 is proved much the same way, the 
only additional wrinkle being external induction on the dimension. Since X is 
limited almost surely, so is g(X) by Lemma 9.7 and similarly with X replaced 
by Y. Fix an appreciable a. Then g(X) EB Z0 is also limited almost surely. 
For any T/ » 0 there is a limited a such that the box Bd, where 
B = { x E T : lxl ~ a} 
satisfies Pr{g(X) EB Z0 E Bd} ~ 1 - T/, and similarly with X replaced by Y. 
Hence 
f L lfg(X)(f)Z0 (x) - Jg(Y)$Z0 (x)I ~ 2TJ + € L lfg(X)$Za (x) - Jg(Y)$Z0 (x)I 
= 2TJ + € L f L · · · f L lfg(X)$Za (x) - Jg(Y)(f)Z0 (x)I 
x1EB x2EB XdEB 
where x = (x1 , ... , xd)- Theorem 4.5 implies the innermost sum is infinitesimal. 
By external ·induction and Theorem 4.5 all sums on the right hand side are 
infinitesimal. Since T/ » 0 was arbitrary, the left hand side is infinitesimal. As 
in the one-dimensional case, it is immediate that g(X) EB Zoe and g(Y) EB Z0 are 
nearly equivalent (when a is appreciable). 
The rest of the proof follows that of Theorem 11.8 almost without change. 
The Slutsky argument is the same, and the rest is unchanged except now h 
maps Td to R. D 
Corollary 11.10 (Cramer-Wold). Let X and Y be random vectors taking values 
in Rd where dis limited. Then X and Y are nearly equivalent if and only if 
(t, X) and (t, Y) are nearly equivalent for every limited t E Rd. 
Proof. For scalars and vector t 
'P(t,X)(s) = E{eis(t,X}} = <px(st). 
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Suppose X and Y are nearly equivalent and t is limited. Then st is limited, for 
all limited s, hence 
<p(t,X)(s) ~ <p(t,Y)(s), s limited. 
Conversely, suppose (t, X) and (t, Y) are limited for all limited t. Then 
<px(t) ~ cpy(t), t limited. 
D 
Corollary 11.11. Suppose Xi and¼ are independent, limited-dimensional ran-
dom vectors for i = 1, 2 and X1 ~ X2 and and Y1 ~ Y2. Then 
The simple proof using characteristic functions and Theorems 11.1 and 11.9 
is left as an exercise. 
Part III 
Statistics 
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Chapter 12 
De Finetti's Theorem 
12.1 Exchangeability 
Fix a positive integer v, and let I = { 1, ... , v}. Fix an arbitrary set S, and 
let X1, ... , Xv be random elements of S. Let II be the set of all permutations 
{bijective functions) 1r: I--+ I. We say the sequence X1, ... , Xv is exchangeable 
if 
Pr(Xi = Si, i E J) = Pr(Xi = S1r(i), i E J) {12.1) 
for all 1r E TI and any choice of s1 , ••• , Sv in S. 
It simplifies discussion if we consider the sequence as single object: a random 
tuple X = (X1, ... ,Xv), which we take to be a random element of the space 
S 1 . We will also consider S 1 , as in set theory, to be the set of all functions 
I--+ S. Then, ifs E S 1 and 1r E 11, it makes sense to writes o 1r, a composition 
of functions I --+ I --+ S and hence also an element of S1 . 
The exchangeable algebra on S 1 is the family :F of functions f : S 1 --+ JR 
satisfying 
f(s) = f(s o 1r), s E S1 , 1r E TI. 
The atoms of :F are the equivalence classes 
(s) = {s01r: 1r E II}. 
A random element X of S~ is exchangeable if 
Pr(X = s) = Pr{X =so 1r), s ES, 1r E II, {12.2) 
which says the same thing as (12.1) in different notation, or, what is equivalent, 
if 
Pr(X = si) = Pr(X = s2), 
The exchangeable algebra on the sample space induced by X is 
E={foX:/E:F}. 
(12.3) 
The atoms of E are the nonempty events of the form x-1 ([s)), the nonempty 
preimages of atoms of :F. 
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12.2 A Simple De Finetti Theorem 
We write Xi for the i-th component of X defined by Xi(w) = X(w)(i) and 
indicate this relationship by X = { X 1, ... , Xv), and this gets us back to the 
simple notation used in {12.1). 
Theorem 12.1 (De Finetti). Let X = (X1, ... , Xv) be exchangeable with v 
unlimited. Let£ be the exchangeable algebra on the sample space induced by X. 
Then for any limited functions h1, ... , hn from S to R with n limited 
E{fi h;(X;) I£}"" fi E{h,(X,) I£} {12.4a) 
and 
E{fi h;(X;)} "" E [D. E{ h;(X;) I £}]. {12.4b) 
The condition that the hi are limited functions means that every value is 
limited. It also means they have a simultaneous limited bound because, the 
sample space being finite, the. maximum of I hi (Xi ( w)) I over all i, j, and w is 
achieved, hence limited. 
In {12.4a) the two sides of the equation are random variables, call them YL 
and YR. What the equation means is YL(w) ~ YR(w) for all w En. 
Lemma 12.2. Suppose X is an exchangeable random element of S1 and Pis 
a uniformly distributed random element of II independent of X. Then X and 
X o P are equal in law. 
Elements of S 1 are maps I --4 Sand elements of II are maps I --4 I. Hence 
X o P is a map / --4 I --4 S, which is an element of S 1 . More precisely, 
X(w) o P(w) is, for each w, a map I --4 I --4 S. The equal in law assertion is 
that 
Pr(X = s) = Pr(X o P = s), SE S1 . {12.5) 
Proof. Fix s E S 1 and let K be the number of elements in [s}. Then it is clear 
from (12.3) that 
1 
Pr(X = s) = K Pr(X E [s)) 
From the bijectivity of permutations and (12.2) and the observation above 
Pr(X o P = s) = Pr(X = s o p-1) 
= Pr(X = soP-1 01r) 
1 -
= K Pr(X E [s o P 1 o 1r}) 
but the last term is Pr(X E [s]) by the definition of ( · J. D 
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Lemma 12.3. With the setup of the theorem, let En denote the algebra generated 
by X1, ... , Xn and£. Then 
{12.6) 
holds for each limited integer n ~ 2. 
Proof The conditional distributions involved in (12.6) are very simple. Fix an 
win n. Write X(w) = s = (s 1 , ••. , sv)- The atom of£ containing w is 
Aw= {w' E Q: X(w') E [s]}. {12. 7a) 
On this atom we have 
1 V 
E{ hn(Xn) I £} = ; L hn(si) (12. 7b) 
i=l 
because by Lemma 12.2 hn(Xn) has the same distribution on this atom as 
hn(SP(i)) where P is a uniformly distributed random permutation and P(i) 
puts equal probability on the points 1, ... , v. 
The atom of En- l containing w is 
Bw = { w' E Aw : Xi(w') = Si, i = 1, ... , n - 1 }. (12.8a) 
On this atom, 
{12.8b) 
by an argument similar to that establishing (12.7b). We must show that the 
right hand sides of {12.7b) and (12.8b) are nearly equal. 
Each of the ~ is limited, hence by the comment following the statement of 
the theorem we may assume there is a simultaneous limited bound a for all of 
them, and 
which implies 
(12.9a) 
because (n - l)a/v is infinitesimal. 
Also, 
I 1 v 1 v I n-1 v I 11- n + 1 ~?n(s,)-;; ~ h,,(s,) = 11(11 - n + 1) ~h,,(s,) 
< (n - l)a 
- V 
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is infinitesimal, which implies 
(12.9b) 
Putting (12.9a) and (12.9b) together finishes the proof. D 
Lemma 12.4. For any random variables X and Y and any algebra A, X ~ Y 
implies EAX ~ EAY and EX~ EY. 
Proof For any £ » 0 we have X - £ :=; Y ~ X + £, which implies EAX - £ :=; 
EAY :=; EAX + € and this can hold for every £ » 0 only if EAX - EAY is 
infinitesimal. The proof for unconditional expectation is similar. D 
Proof of the theorem. 
e{g h,(X,) I e} = e[e{g h,(X,) I E:n-1} I e] 
= e[}j h,(X,) · E{hn(Xn) I E:n-1} I e] 
"'e[}j h,(X;) · E{hn(Xn) I e} I e] 
= E{hn(Xn) I e}. e{}j h;(X;) I e} 
(12.10) 
the first equality being Ee Een- i = Ee, the second and third equalities being 
EAXY = Y EAX when Y E A for A= &n-1 and A=£, respectively, and the 
near equality being Lemmas 12.3 and 12.4. Then (12.4a) follows from (12.10) by 
external induction, and (12.4b) follows by another application of Lemma 12.4. 
D 
12.3 Philosophical Interpretation 
The philosophical interpretation of the theorem is that the random variables 
Xi, X2, ... Xv are "nearly" conditionally independent given the exchangeable 
algebra by {12.4a) and (exactly) marginally identically distributed (condition-
ally and unconditionally) by exchangeability, and their joint conditional distri-
bution is "nearly" determined by the marginal distributions by (12.4b). 
Hence, if we adopt a Bayesian statistical model for data X 1 , ..• , Xn that 
assumes they are exactly conditionally independent and identically distributed 
given the exchangeable algebra, then we make only infinitesimal errors. 
This setup is a bit more abstract than most discussions of Bayesian theory 
{but no more abstract than most discussions of de Finetti theorems). It is hard 
to see the exchangeable algebra playing the role of a Bayesian parameter. But at 
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least in Nelson-style theory there is no heavy probabilistic abstraction to wade 
through. We know that the exchangeable algebra £ induces a partition at(£) 
on the sample space. If 8 is a random element of any space that induces the 
same partition, then we can write E{ · 18} in place of E{ · IE} and things will 
look more Bayesian just from the change of notation. 
Thus the philosophical import of de Finetti's theorem is that independent 
and identically distributed (IID) assumptions arise in quite different ways for 
the Bayesian and the frequentist. The frequentist must assume that the data 
actually are IID, which is a very strong assumption. The Bayesian only "as-
sumes" that the data are exchangeable, a much weaker assumption. Moreover, 
for a subjective Bayesian, exchangeability is not really an assumption but merely 
a lack of know ledge that would allow one to treat X differently from X o P ( using 
the notation of Lemma 12.2). 
12.4 A Fancier De Finetti Theorem 
Theorem 12.5 (De Finetti II). Let X = (X 1 , ... , Xv) be exchangeable with v 
unlimited. Let£ be the exchangeable algebra on the sample space induced by X. 
Then for any functions h 1, ... , hn from S to JR with n limited such that h 1 ( X 1), 
· ·., hn(Xn) and n~=l hi(Xi) and n~=l E{ hi(Xi) I£} are L1 
E{fi h,(X,) I£}"" Di E{h;(X,) I£}, almost surely, (12.lla) 
and 
E{fi h,(X;)} ""E [fl E{h;(X;) I£}]. (12.llb) 
In (12.lla) the two sides of the equation are random variables, call them YL 
and YR. What the equation means is for every f » 0 there exists an event N 
such that Pr(N) ~ f and YL(w) ~ Yn(w) except for win N. 
Proof. Equation (12.llb) is implied by (12.4b) and Lemma 6.7. By Theo-
rem 6.10 h1(X1), ... , hn(Xn) and TI:=1 hi(Xi) are £ 1 on almost every atom of 
E. On such atoms equation {12.lla) is implied by {12.4a) and Lemma 6.7. D 
Whether one prefers Theorem 12.1 or Theorem 12.5 is a matter of taste. 
The restriction to limited functions ( the external analog of bounded functions) 
makes the statement of Theorem 12.1 much simpler, only involving nonstandard 
analysis through the basic idea of the existence of infinitesimals. Theorem 12.5 
is stronger, but only in a rather trivial way involving Lemma 6. 7, and involves 
the more complicated concepts almost surely and £ 1 that use much more non-
standard analysis. 
Theorem 12.1 only involves master's level calculations. Both the statement 
and the proof are elementary. The key issue is that {12.7b) is very close to 
(12.8b) whenever v is much larger than n. Everything else is just applying 
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rules of probability theory that are no different in Nelson-style theory from 
Kolmogorov-style theory (master's level or PhD level). 
Chapter 13 
Almost Sure Convergence 
We introduced almost sure convergence in Section 7.1. Now we apply it to 
a few things. 
13.1 The Law of Large Numbers 
Theorem 16.3 in Nelson (1987) is the law of large numbers. 
Theorem 13.1 (The Law of Large Numbers). Suppose Xi, X2, ... , Xv are 
II D L 1 random variables with mean µ. Define 
- 1 n 
Xn=-LXi. 
n i=i 
Then X n converges to µ almost surely. 
(13.1) 
We do not usually deal with almost sure convergence by directly applying the 
definition. What we usually use is the following theorem, which is Theorem 7.2 
in Nelson {1987). 
Theorem 13.2. Let Xi, ... , Xv be random variables, then Xn converges almost 
surely to zero if and only if 
Pr { sup IXnl 2 ..x} ~ 0, µ ~ oo, A» 0. (13.2) µ5n$v 
13.2 The Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem 
Suppose Xi, ... , Xv are IID random variables defined on a finite sample 
space having common (marginal) distribution function F, and Fn is the empir-
ical distribution function defined by 
....... 1 n 
Fn(x) = ;; L Ic-oo,:z:](Xi), 
i=i 
XE JR. 
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Then for each fixed x the random variable Fn(x) is a "sample mean" of the form 
(13.1) with "population mean" F(x) = E{Fn(x)}. Also Fn(x) is a limited, hence 
L 1, random variable. Thus the law of large numbers applies and gives almost 
surely 
n ~ oo, (13.3a) 
which by Theorem 13.2 holds if and only if 
Pr c~~~" jFn(x) - F(x)j ;;: ,\} ce o, µ ~ oo, .X » 0. (13.3b) 
These statements (13.3a) and (13.3b) are different statements for each fixed x. 
In (13.3a) the exception sets may depend on x. 
The Glivenko-Cantelli theorem says these statements hold uniformly in x. 
Theorem 13.3 (Glivenko-Cantelli). Suppose X1, ... , Xv are JID random vari-
ables defined on a finite sample space having common (marginal} distribution 
function F, and suppose Fn is the empirical distribution function for sample 
size n. Then almost surely 
sup I.Fn(x) - F(x)I ~ 0, 
xEIR 
n~oo. (13.4a) 
By Theorem 13.2 the statement (13.4a) holds almost surely if and only if 
Pr { sup sup I.Fn(x) - F(x)I 2:: .x} ~ 0, 
µ$n$vxEIR 
µ ~ oo, .X » O. (13.4b) 
As in the usual proof of the Kolmogorov-style Glivenko-Cantelli theorem, the 
proof starts with the statements {13.3a), one for each fixed x, which are implied 
by the law of large numbers. These statements do not obviously imply (13.4a) 
because the exception sets in (13.3a) depend on x. Some device must be used to 
reduce an uncountable infinity of exception sets to a limited number. Actually 
we work with the statements that do not explicitly involve "almost surely" and 
want to derive the one statement {13.4b) from the many statements {13.3b), but 
here too, the implication is not obvious. As in the usual Kolmogorov-style proof, 
the device we use is monotonicity of distribution functions and compactness of 
the unit interval. 
Proof. Let T be the support of F. To simplify notation choose€ > 0 smaller 
than any spacing in T so we always have 
F(x - e) = sup F(y) 
yET 
y<x 
whenever x ET. Fixµ~ oo and A» 0, and choose a limited natural number 
k such that 1 / k ~ Aj 4. Then there are unique points Xi E T determined by 
i = 1, ... ,k 
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( meaning for each i there is a unique element of T that can be Xi and not 
meaning that the Xi are distinct-it may be that Xi= Xi' when i < i', in which 
case Xi = Xj for i $ j ::5 i'). Also, since T is finite, there exists a (nonunique) 
point xo satisfying F(xo) = 0. 
Now for i = 1, ... , k and Xi-I < x < Xi we have 
Fn(x) ~ F(x) + ,\---+ Fn(Xi - e) ~ F(xi-1) + ,\ 
-- ,\ 
---+ Fn(Xi - e) ~ F(xi - €) + 2 
the last implication holding because of 
i-1 2 2 ,\ 
F(xi-i) ~ -k- > F(xi) - k > F(xi - E) - k ~ F(xi - €) - 2, 
the interpretation of these statements being "omega by omega," that is, Fn(x) 
is a random variable defined by 
1 n 
Fn(x)(w) = - ~ 1(-oo,x] (Xi(w)) 
n i=l 
and the implications mean that the set of w such that Fn(x)(w) ~ F(x) + ,\ 
holds is included in the set of w such that Fn(Xi - E)(w) ~ F(xi - €) + ½ holds. 
Similarly, 
Fn(x) ::5 F(x) - ,\---+ Fn(Xi-i) $ F(xi - €) - ,\ 
-- ,\ 
---+ Fn(Xi-1) $ F(xi-1) - 2 
the last implication holding because of 
i 1 ,\ 
F(xi - €) < k $ F(xi-1) + k $ F(Xi-1) + 4. 
Putting these together and using monotonicity and subadditivity of probability 
gives 
and since we also obviously have 
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we get 
Pr { sup sup IFn(x) - F(x)j ~ A} 
µSnSv :r:ER 
xoSx<xk 
~ tPr { sup IFn(Xi - e) - F(xi - €)1 ~ ~} 
i=l µ$nSv 2 
+ tPr{ sup IFn(Xi-1)-F(xi-1)1 ~ ~} (13.5) 
i=l µSn$v 2 
and we are done except for two minor points. First, since F(x0 ) = 0 and 
F(xk) = 1 it is never possible to have Xi outside the interval (xo, Xk] and 
we have Fn(xo) = 0 and Fn(xk) = 1 for all n (for all w). Hence the inner 
supremum on the left hand side of (13.5) can run over all of R rather than 
just the interval [xo, Xk) without changing the event whose probability is being 
calculated. Second, by Corollary 3.8, if all the terms on the right hand side of 
(13.5) are infinitesimal, then their sum is infinitesimal. D 
Caution: Lemma 10.1 and Theorem 10.4 say that Fn converging to F im-
plies convergence in distribution of (the distribution determined by) F'n to (the 
distribution determined by) F, if (a very big "if') random variables having this 
limiting distribution ( determined by F) are almost surely limited! The (Nelson-
style analog of the) Glivenko-Cantelli theorem is true regardless of whether or 
not F has this property, but it doesn't say what you might think it says from 
the analogy with Kolmogorov-style theory. 
13.3 Prohorov Consistency 
We want a theorem analogous to the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem that applies 
when X 1 , ••• , X,, are random elements of an arbitrary metric space having 
common (marginal) probability measure P, and Pn is the empirical measure 
defined by 
AcS. 
Then (just like we saw for empirical distribution functions in the preceding 
section) for each fixed A the random variable Pn(A) is a "sample mean" of 
the form (13.1) with "population mean" P(A) = E{.I\(A)}. Also Pn(A) is a 
limited, hence L1, random variable Thus the law of large numbers applies and 
gives almost surely 
I.Pn(A) - P(A)I ~ 0, n~oo, (13.6a) 
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which holds if and only if 
Pr{,.~~~" JPn(A) - P(A)J ;:: ~} "'0, µ ~ oo, ,\ » 0. (13.6b} 
These statements (13.6a} and {13.6b} are different statements for each fixed A. 
In (13.6a} the exception sets may depend on A. 
We investigate the conditions under which Pn converges to P. In order to 
discuss convergence, we need a metric for convergence of probability measures. 
The natural one to use is the Prohorov metric, which was defined in Section 9.3. 
We say Pn converges almost surely to P (in the Prohorov metric) if almost 
surely 
n~oo, {13.7a} 
which holds if and only if 
Pr { sup 1r(Pn, P) ~ .x} ~ 0, 
µ:5n:5v 
µ ~ oo, ,\ » 0. (13.7b} 
We say P is nearly tight if for every € » 0 there exists a set F of limited 
cardinality such that P(FE) ~ 1 - €, where FE, the €-dilation of F, was defined 
in Section 9.3. 
Note that a random variable X that is limited almost surely is nearly tight 
because for any e » 0, there exists a limited a such that Pr(IXI ~ a) ~ €. So, 
if we define 
F = { kE : k E Z, lkf I ~ a } , 
then F has limited cardinality and FE covers [-a, a]. Hence Pr(FE) ~ 1 - €. 
Theorem 13.4. Suppose X1, ... , X,., are ]ID random elements of a metric 
space having common (marginal) probability measure P and Pn is the empirical 
measure for sample size n, then a necessary and sufficient condition for Pn to 
converge almost surely to P (in the Prohorov metric) is that P is nearly tight. 
Proof. Let 1r denote the Prohorov m~tric. Then, by Lemma 9.2 and the com-
ments on page 58 about the behavior of this metric, 
1r(Pn, P) ~A~(\/€> 0)(3A C S)(Pn(A) > P(A") + A - €} 
~ sup (Pn(A) - P(A")) ~ ,\ 
ACS 
the arrows meaning that the statements are equivalent "omega by omega," that 
is if one holds at some point in the sample space, then so do the others. Hence 
(13.7b) is equivalent to 
Pr { sup sup (Pn(A) - P(A"}) ~ -'} ~ 0, 
µ:5n:5vAcS 
µ ~ oo, ,\ » 0. (13.8) 
First, we prove necessity. Assume (13.8), and suppose to get a contradiction 
that P is not nearly tight. Hence there is an € » 0 such that we do not have 
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P(P:) ~ 1 - f for any set F of limited cardinality. Let An = {Xi, ... ,Xn }, 
that is, An is the support of Pn, so Pn (An) = 1. Then a necessary condition 
that {13.8) hold is 
This implies 
Pr{l - P(A~) ~ €} ~ 0, n~oo. 
1 Pr{l -P{A~) ~ €} < 2 
{13.9) 
{13.10) 
holds for all unlimited n, hence by overspill for some limited n. But this is 
a contradiction because An has at most n points and by our choice of €, this 
implies P(A~) < 1-f always (for all omega) and hence Pr {1 - P(A~) > €} = 1. 
That finishes the proof of the necessity of near tightness. 
Now, we prove sufficiency. Assume near tightness. Fix).» 0, and choose a 
set F = {x1, ... ,xm} of limited cardinality such that P(F>.f3 ) ~ 1 - A/3. 
Disjointify the balls { Xi},\/J defining recursively 
i-1 
Bi= {xi}-\/3 \ LJ B;. 
j=l 
Then the nonempty Bi partition p>./3 • 
Let I be the set of all subsets of { 1, ... , m}, and define 
lEI. 
We do not need A0 as a notation for the empty set, so let us reuse the notation, 
redefining this to be 
A0 = S \ p>./3 • 
Note that the diameter of each Bi is less than )., so if a set A contains even one 
point of Bi, then A,\ contains all of Bi. Hence 
I EI\0. 
By the law of large numbers {13.3b) 
Pr t~~- IPn(A1) - P(A1 )I ;:: ~} "'0, µ~co, I EI. 
Consider a point in the sample space ( an omega) such that 
sup sup jPn(A1) - P(A1 )j < ~3 , µ~n$vlEI 
holds. Then for any A C S define 
I = { i E { 1, ... , m} : A n Enif 0 } 
13.4. DISCUSSION 
so when µ ~ n ~ v we have 
Pn(A) - P(A'\) = Pn(A \ p>./3) + Pn(A n A1) - P(A>.) 
~ Pn(A0) + Pn(A1) - P(A1) 
2.X .... 
< 3 + Pn(A1)- P(A1) 
< .X 
Hence for µ ~ oo 
Pr { sup sup (Pn(A) - P(A>.)) ~ .x} 
µ$n$vACS 
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~ LPr{ sup I.Pn(A1)- P(A1)l ~ ~} 
IEI µ$n$v 
Since I has limited cardinality (less than 2m, which is limited by Theorem 2.4), 
this sum is infinitesimal by Corollary 3.8, and, since .X » 0 was arbitrary, we 
have {13.8) and are done. D 
13.4 Discussion 
13.4.1 Kolmogorov-Style Pathology 
The concept we call "near tightness" that plays such an important role 
in Theorem 13.4 is the Nelson-style analog of what van der Vaart and Wellner 
(1996, p. 17) call pre-tightness. Their Lemma 1.3.2 says that a Borel probability 
measure on a metric space is pre-tight if and only if it is separable. A Borel 
probability measure Pon a metric space is separable when it has a separable 
support, that is, there exists a Borel measurable set A such that P(A) = 1 and 
A has a countable dense subset. 
So far this is fairly simple, but, according to the discussion on p. 24 of 
van der Vaart and Wellner (1996), it is undecidable under the usual axioms 
of set theory whether nonseparable Borel probability measures can exist. It is 
known that one could add to mathematics the axiom that they do not exist 
without causing inconsistency ( that is, if mathematics is inconsistent with this 
new axiom, then it is already inconsistent before this axiom is added). But 
it is "apparently unknown" (say van der Vaart and Wellner, 1996) whether 
nonseparable probability measures can consistently exist (whatever that means). 
It is incredible what a morass we sink into with this notion. Countable 
additivity is supposed to make things simple. Here it seems to make things 
about as complicated as they can possibly be. Kolmogorov-style probability 
theory allows an incredible amount of pathology and requires extreme technical 
virtuosity to navigate around it. 
In Nelson-style theory these things are simple. Non-tight (not nearly tight) 
probability measures exist, and there are very simple examples of them, such as 
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the discrete uniform distribution on the integers 1, ... , v with v unlimited. It 
is clear in Theorem 13.4 what (near) tightness does and why it is needed. 
13.4.2 Near Tightness and Topology 
On a slightly different point, why did we choose to make our concept near 
tightness the analog of Kolmogorov-style pre-tightness rather than tightness. 
The reason is that Kolmogorov-style tightness involves compact sets, and it 
is not possible to define compact sets in "radically elementary" nonstandard 
analysis. It is possible to define compact sets in the full theory of nonstandard 
analysis (Nelson, unpublished, p. 13 for the definition of compact subsets of IR 
and p. 15 for the definition of compact subsets of general topological spaces), 
but we don't want to use the full theory. Thus we avoid topology and the 
notions compact, closed, and open. The same issue is why closed and open sets 
do not appear in our version of the portmanteau theorem (Theorem 9.6) and 
are replaced by €-dilations and €-erosions. 
13.4.3 Prohorov Consistency and Glivenko-Cantelli 
Although we drew an analogy between Theorems 13.3 and 13.4, and they 
are quite analogous in their conditions and their proofs, the Kolmogorov-style 
analog of Theorem 13.4 is not what is called a uniform Glivenko-Cantelli theorem 
(see van der Vaart and Wellner, 1996, Chapter 2.4). 
13.4.4 Statistical Inference 
Whatever the Prohorov-consistency theorem is called, it does show in what 
sense statistical estimation is possible with no assumptions about the true un-
known distribution except near tightness. We know from Theorem 13.4 that, 
in the language of statistics, Pn is a consistent estimator of the true unknown 
distribution P. 
This remains true for the "minimum Prohorov distance estimator." If we 
have a statistical model f, which we take to be a finite family of probability 
distributions and we let Pn be any estimator - that is, a function of the data 
X1, ... , Xn taking values in P - that satisfies 
1r(Pn, Pn) ;S min 1r(P, Pn), 
PEP 
then Pn is a consistent estimator of the true unknown distribution P by the 
triangle inequality. 
Admittedly, ''minimum Prohorov distance estimators" are very hard to cal-
culate and not used in practical applications. We will have to do a lot more to 
get a useful Nelson-style theory of statistics. But it's a start. 
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